Colorado § 16-11-301 - Sentences - commitments - correctional facilities - county jail - age limit.

§ 16-11-301. Sentences - commitments - correctional facilities - county jail - age limit.

(1) As a general rule, imprisonment for the conviction of a felony by an adult offender shall be served by confinement in an appropriate facility as determined by the executive director of the department of corrections. In such cases, the court will sentence the offender to the custody of the executive director of the department of corrections.

(2) Unless otherwise provided in the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S., a defendant convicted of a crime which may be punished by imprisonment in a county jail may be sentenced to a correctional facility other than state correctional facilities if at the time of sentencing the defendant is sixteen years of age or older but under the age of twenty-one years, and if, in the opinion of the court, rehabilitation of the person convicted can best be obtained by such a sentence, and if it also appears to the court that the best interests of the person and of the public and the ends of justice would thereby be served.

(3) Repealed.

(4) With regard to any juvenile sentenced to the department of corrections, the executive director shall consider the juvenile's safety and well-being in determining the facility in which to house the juvenile, the persons with whom the juvenile has contact, and the activities in which the juvenile engages.

Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 248, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-11-301. L. 79: (1) and (2) amended and (3) repealed, pp. 679, 705, §§ 6, 88, effective July 1. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 53, § 14, effective July 1. L. 96: (4) added, p. 1680, § 4, effective January 1, 1997.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Criminal Procedure in Colorado — A Summary and Recommendations for Improvement", see 22 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 221 (1950). For article, "Commitment of Misdemeanants to the Colorado State Reformatory", see 29 Dicta 294 (1952). For article, "One Year Review of Constitutional and Administrative Law", see 34 Dicta 79 (1957). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law", see 34 Dicta 98 (1957). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 35 Dicta 26 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 37 Dicta 21 (1960). For article, "Indeterminate Sentencing of Criminals", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 536 (1961). For article, "Comment on Indeterminate Sentencing of Criminals", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 544 (1961). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 38 Dicta 65 (1961).

Annotator's note. Since § 16-11-301 is similar to repealed § 39-10-1, C.R.S. 1963, § 39-10-1, CRS 53, and CSA, C. 48, § 512, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section. Most of the cases annotated were decided prior to the 1979 amendments to this section deleting references to the Colorado state reformatory.

The power to confine persons is delegated by legislative enactment; courts have no such inherent power. Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

A penitentiary sentence is more severe than a reformatory sentence under Colorado law because it carries the stigma of a felony. Petsche v. Clingan, 273 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1960).

Sentence to reformatory within discretion of judge. Where a defendant is less than 21 years of age at the time of sentence, a trial judge is vested with a discretion to sentence him to the reformatory or the state penitentiary. McKinney v. People, 138 Colo. 294, 332 P.2d 895 (1958).

Under this section persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary who are under the age of 21 years may, in the discretion of the court, be sentenced to the state reformatory or to the penitentiary, as the best interest of the person and of the public may require. Roy v. Tinsley, 142 Colo. 241, 350 P.2d 564 (1960).

The question of sentence, once there is a conviction, is left to the discretion of the court; this was clearly the intent of the general assembly. Bitner v. Tinsley, 151 Colo. 367, 378 P.2d 203 (1963).

The choice of place of confinement is within the sound discretion of the court, just as is the length of term of imprisonment. People v. Weihs, 187 Colo. 124, 529 P.2d 317 (1974).

Court not bound by probation reports. A probation officer's finding or recommendation that a defendant would benefit from probation does not require the trial court to grant probation, or to sentence defendant to an indeterminate term in the state reformatory. Bitner v. Tinsley, 151 Colo. 367, 378 P.2d 203 (1963).

And sentence stands unless discretion is abused. It is the trial court, having the opportunity to examine a petitioner and the probation reports, who is best equipped to determine where he should be required to serve his sentence, and in the absence of a showing of abuse of judicial discretion the sentence must stand. Bitner v. Tinsley, 151 Colo. 367, 378 P.2d 203 (1963).

This section read with statute fixing penalty for crime. In considering whether a sentence is within the provisions of the statute fixing the penalty for the commission of a crime, this section which provides for commitment to the reformatory in certain cases is fully applicable and applies when the pertinent facts are present. Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 265 P.2d 226 (1953); Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

It refers to age of defendant at time of sentence and not to the time of the commission of an offense. McKinney v. People, 138 Colo. 294, 332 P.2d 895 (1958).

Application of this section is limited to those persons who are of the full age of 18 (now 21) years at the time of sentence. Gallegos v. Tinsley, 139 Colo. 157, 337 P.2d 386 (1959).

The age of a defendant on the date of the commission of the crime is not determinative of the punishment to be imposed, but rather his age at the time of sentence is controlling. Maes v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 405, 353 P.2d 586 (1960).

It does not apply to class one felonies. This section has at all times contained the exception pertaining to persons convicted of crimes involving the penalty of imprisonment for life (now class one felonies). Thompson v. People, 136 Colo. 336, 316 P.2d 1043 (1957); Maes v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 405, 353 P.2d 586 (1960).

Where court is bound by jury sentencing. Where jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and fixed penalty at imprisonment for life, court had no discretion but to give sentence accordingly. People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 502 P.2d 420 (1972).

Absent statute, minor punishable as adult. Unless there is a statute which makes mandatory a sentence, in the case of a minor, other than that applicable to adults, an offense committed by a minor is punishable in the same manner as though committed by an adult. Gallegos v. Tinsley, 139 Colo. 157, 337 P.2d 386 (1959).

Court may sentence juvenile as an adult. The district court has the authority to sentence a juvenile charged as an adult to the department of corrections for the term of imprisonment authorized for adults. Rocha v. People, 713 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1986).

The court's statutory authority to sentence a defendant to the department of corrections does not expressly include the authority to dictate the conditions of confinement. The management, supervision, and control of department facilities are exclusively vested in its director. People v. Harris, 934 P.2d 882 (Colo. App. 1997).

Trial court lacks jurisdiction to order that a juvenile, sentenced as an adult, be placed in a therapeutic program within the department of institutions (now human services). The executive director of the department of corrections has the sole authority to determine where an offender serves his or her sentence. White v. Adamek, 907 P.2d 735 (Colo. App. 1995).

The legislative intent of this section is to give the executive director of the department of corrections ultimate responsibility for placing of inmates in particular facilities. Thus, the court could recommend sentencing to an out-of-state facility, but it could not order such placement. People v. Brack, 821 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1991).

A county court is bound by this section in the sentencing of minors. Latham v. People, 136 Colo. 252, 317 P.2d 894, 334 P.2d 437 (1957).

Court may not disregard legislative sentencing mandates. A court is not free to disregard the legislative mandate of §§ 16-11-201 and 16-11-308 and this section, even when it appears to dictate a sentence which the court considers inappropriate to a particular case. People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1009 (Colo. 1981).

A sentence providing for incarceration in an institution other than that provided by law is void as beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to afford relief from a void sentence, but not from an erroneous sentence. Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

A judgment and sentence to the penitentiary for any term, when the law requires a reformatory confinement, is a void judgment and habeas corpus is a proper remedy to afford relief. Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 265 P.2d 226 (1953); Barrett v. People, 136 Colo. 144, 315 P.2d 192 (1957); Petsche v. Clingan, 273 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1960); Stilley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963).

Sentence valid. Where it is within the discretion of a trial court to sentence a defendant to the reformatory or to the penitentiary and the sentence is to the penitentiary, and within the minimum and maximum term of years authorized, the sentence is valid. Bartell v. People, 137 Colo. 300, 324 P.2d 378 (1958).

Penitentiary sentence was not abuse of discretion. Where the sentence of one convicted of a crime to the state reformatory or to the penitentiary rests in the discretion of the trial court, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly denied where the record discloses that the petitioners, who were 18 years of age, had four previous convictions for various offenses and the probation officer recommended sentences to the penitentiary rather than to the state reformatory, and petitioners were so sentenced. Roy v. Tinsley, 142 Colo. 241, 350 P.2d 564 (1960).

Reformatory sentence in county different from court is proper. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court to impose the sentence in a reformatory and although the reformatory may be in another county from that in which the particular justice conducts proceedings, whatever authority is essential to commitment therein is necessarily implied. Aranda v. Patterson, 146 Colo. 424, 361 P.2d 782 (1961).

Applied in People v. Baca, 179 Colo. 156, 499 P.2d 317 (1972); People v. Ybarra, 652 P.2d 182 (Colo. App. 1982); Castro v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1982); People v. Lockhart, 699 P.2d 1332 (Colo. 1985).