Colorado § 14-5-314 - Limited immunity of petitioner.

§ 14-5-314. Limited immunity of petitioner.

(a) Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding under this article before a responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the petitioner in another proceeding.

(b) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this article.

(c) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this article committed by a party while physically present in this state to participate in the proceeding.

Source: L. 93: Entire article R&RE, p. 1593, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2003: (a) and (c) amended, p. 1254, § 22, effective July 1, 2004.

COMMENT

Under subsection (a), direct or indirect participation in a UIFSA proceeding does not subject a petitioner to an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the petitioner by the forum state in other litigation between the parties. The primary object of this prohibition is to preclude joining disputes over child custody and visitation with the establishment, enforcement, or modification of child support. This prohibition strengthens the ban on visitation litigation established in Section 305(d). A petition for affirmative relief under UIFSA limits the jurisdiction of the tribunal to the boundaries of the support proceeding. In sum, proceedings under UIFSA are not suitable vehicles for the relitigation of all of the issues arising out of a foreign divorce or custody case. Only enforcement or modification of the support portion of such decrees or orders are relevant. Other issues, such as custody and visitation, or matters relating to other aspect of the divorce decree, are collateral and have no place in a UIFSA proceeding.

Subsection (b) grants a litigant a variety of limited immunity from service of process during the time that party is physically present in a state for a UIFSA proceeding. The immunity provided is in no way comparable to diplomatic immunity, however, which should be clear from reading subsection (c) in conjunction with the other subsections.

Subsection (c) does not extend immunity to civil litigation unrelated to the support proceeding which stems from contemporaneous acts committed by a party while present in the state for the support litigation. For example, a petitioner involved in an automobile accident or a contract dispute over the cost of lodging while present in the state does not have immunity from a civil suit on those issues.

ANNOTATION

While a petition for relief under UIFSA limits the jurisdiction of the tribunal to the boundaries of the support proceeding, a claim of overpayment of child support is still within the boundaries of the proceeding. In re Haddad, 93 P.3d 617 (Colo. App. 2004).

Section 14-5-607 (b) conferred personal jurisdiction over another state's child support enforcement agency that continued to collect withholdings from plaintiff's wages under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), contrary to a previous Colorado court order vacating the other state's judgment upon which the wage assignment was based. Vogan v. County of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336 (Colo. App. 2008).

While this section protects a petitioner participating in a UIFSA proceeding before a responding tribunal from being subject to personal jurisdiction in another proceeding, the statute does not prevent the Colorado court from the continued exercise of subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce its prior order. There are no due process concerns where another state availed itself of the provisions of UIFSA to reach plaintiff's earnings in Colorado. Section 14-5-607 (b) allows a court to enter "other appropriate orders", including orders related to plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and restitution based upon defendant's continued collection of child support under the voided order. Vogan v. County of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336 (Colo. App. 2008).

Although this section does not confer personal jurisdiction over plaintiff's civil theft claim with respect to defendant's collection of child support despite the voided wage assignment, the Colorado long-arm statute confers jurisdiction where plaintiff was harmed by defendant's tortious acts within this state and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Vogan v. County of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336 (Colo. App. 2008).