Colorado § 13-80-110 - Causes barred in state of origin.

§ 13-80-110. Causes barred in state of origin.

If a cause of action arises in another state or territory or in a foreign country and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained in that state, territory, or foreign country by reason of lapse of time, the cause of action shall not be maintained in this state.

Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 700, § 1, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "A Decade of Colorado Law: Conflict of Laws, Security, Contracts, and Equity", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1951). For article, "Conflict of Laws, Constitutional Law, Elections", see 30 Dicta 449 (1953). For article, "Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws Borrowing Statutes", see 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 287 (1960).

Annotator's note. Since § 13-80-110 is similar to former § 13-80-118 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

This section evidenced the purpose of the general assembly to afford to a debtor sued in Colorado relief from a creditor seeking judgment on a debt barred in the jurisdiction where the cause arose. Simon v. Wilnes, 97 Colo. 78, 47 P.2d 406 (1935).

This section does not violate the "full faith and credit" clause in § 1 of art. IV, U.S. Const. Kelly v. Heller, 74 Colo. 470, 222 P. 648 (1924).

"Arises in another state" must mean in the courts of that state. It cannot mean a right of action not cognizable by the courts of that state. Folda Real Estate Co. v. Jacobsen, 75 Colo. 16, 223 P. 748 (1924).

This section provides in substance that an action shall not be maintained in this state on a claim arising in another state and barred by the laws thereof. Smith v. Kent Oil Co., 128 Colo. 80, 261 P.2d 149 (1953).

If an action is not barred in the state where the cause of action arose because of the defendant's absence therefrom, it is not barred in Colorado. Schoenfeld v. Neher, 428 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1970).

In the absence of a showing, there is a presumption that the law of another jurisdiction is the same as the common law of Colorado, but no presumption that it is the same as Colorado statute law. Smith v. Kent Oil Co., 128 Colo. 80, 261 P.2d 149 (1953).

Specific adoption of the choice of law provision under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act by both Colorado, in § 14-5-604, and Texas overrides application of the general borrowing limitations statute set forth in this section. In re Morris, 32 P.3d 625 (Colo. App. 2001).

Neither the borrowing statute nor the Uniform Conflict of Laws - Limitations Act (UCL-LA), §§ 13-82-101 to 13-82-107, is more specific than the other. Because each statute uses different factors to assign a limitations period, the court is prevented from directly comparing them in order to read one as an exception to the other. Jenkins v. Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2009).

Because it was enacted more recently, the borrowing statute, and not the UCL-LA, controls. Based on the general assembly's prescribed rules of statutory construction, because the conflicts between the statutes cannot be resolved on specificity and the borrowing statute is the more recent enactment, the borrowing statute applies to plaintiffs' claims. Jenkins v. Pan. Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2009).