Colorado § 13-54-102 - Property exempt - commingled exempt and nonexempt assets - definitions.

§ 13-54-102. Property exempt - commingled exempt and nonexempt assets - definitions.

(1) The following property is exempt from levy and sale under writ of attachment or writ of execution:

(a) The necessary wearing apparel of the debtor and each dependent to the extent of two thousand dollars in value;

(b) Watches, jewelry, and articles of adornment of the debtor and each dependent to the extent of two thousand five hundred dollars in value;

(c) The library, family pictures, and school books of the debtor and the debtor's dependents to the extent of two thousand dollars in value, not including any property constituting all or part of the stock in trade of the debtor;

(d) Burial sites, including spaces in mausoleums, to the extent of one site or space for the debtor and each dependent;

(e) The household goods owned and used by the debtor or the debtor's dependents to the extent of six thousand dollars in value;

(f) Provisions and fuel on hand for the use or consumption of the debtor or the debtor's dependents to the extent of six hundred dollars in value;

(g) (I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(g)(II) of this section, in the case of every debtor engaged in agriculture as the debtor's principal occupation, including farming, ranching, and dairy production or the raising of livestock or poultry, the following, in the aggregate value of one hundred thousand dollars:

(A) All livestock, poultry, or other animals;

(B) All crops, dairy products, and agricultural products grown, raised, or produced; and

(C) All tractors, farm implements, trucks used in agricultural operations, harvesting equipment, seed, and agricultural machinery and tools.

(II) Only one exemption in the aggregate value of one hundred thousand dollars is allowed for a debtor and the debtor's spouse under subsection (1)(g)(I) of this section. In the event that property is claimed as exempt by a debtor or the debtor's spouse under subsection (1)(g)(I) of this section, no exemption is allowed for the debtor or the debtor's spouse under subsection (1)(i) of this section.

(h) Except for amounts due under court-ordered support of children or spouse which are subject to the exemption provisions of section 13-54-104, all money received by any person as a pension, compensation, or allowance for any purpose on account or arising out of the services of such person as a member of the armed forces of the United States in time of war or armed conflict, and whether in the actual possession of the recipient thereof or deposited or loaned by him, and a like exemption to the unremarried widow or widower and the children of such person who receive a pension, compensation, or allowance of any kind from the United States on account or arising out of such service by a deceased member of such armed forces; and when a debtor entitled to exemption under this paragraph (h) dies or leaves his family said exemption shall extend to the dependents of said debtor;

(h.5) The articles of military equipment personally owned by members of the National Guard;

(i) (I) Except as described in subsection (1)(i)(II) of this section, the stock in trade, supplies, fixtures, maps, machines, tools, electronics, equipment, books, and business materials of a debtor that are used and kept for the purpose of carrying on:

(A) The debtor's primary gainful occupation, in the aggregate value of sixty thousand dollars; or

(B) Any other gainful occupation, in the aggregate value of twenty thousand dollars.

(II) Exempt property described in this subsection (1)(i) may not also be claimed as exempt pursuant to subsection (1)(j) of this section.

(j) (I) Up to two motor vehicles or bicycles kept and used by any debtor, in the aggregate value of fifteen thousand dollars; or

(II) (A) Up to two motor vehicles or bicycles kept and used by any debtor who is elderly or disabled or by any debtor's spouse or dependent who is elderly or disabled, in the aggregate value of twenty-five thousand dollars.

(B) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2007, p. 876, § 3, effective May 14, 2007.)

(III) The exemption provided in this paragraph (j) does not apply to snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, golf carts, boats or other watercraft, travel trailers, tent trailers, or motor homes.

(k) The library of any debtor who is a professional person, including a minister or priest of any faith, kept and used by the debtor in carrying on his or her profession, in the value of three thousand dollars; except that exemptions with respect to any of the property described in this paragraph (k) may not also be claimed under paragraph (i) of this subsection (1);

(l) (I) (A) The cash surrender value of policies or certificates of life insurance that have been owned by a debtor for a continuous, unexpired period of forty-eight months or more, to the extent of two hundred fifty thousand dollars for writs of attachment or writs of execution issued against the insured; except that there is no exemption for increases in cash value from extraordinary moneys contributed to a policy or certificate of life insurance during the forty-eight months prior to the issuance of the writ of attachment or writ of execution; and

(B) The proceeds of policies or certificates of life insurance paid upon the death of the insured to a designated beneficiary, without limitation as to amount, for writs of attachment or writs of execution issued against the insured.

(II) The provisions of this paragraph (l) shall not be interpreted to provide an exemption for attachment or execution of the proceeds of any policy or certificate of life insurance to pay the debts of a beneficiary of such policy or certificate.

(III) The provisions of this paragraph (l) shall not provide an exemption for attachment or execution of the proceeds of any policy or certificate of life insurance if the beneficiary of such policy or certificate is the estate of the insured.

(IV) For purposes of this paragraph (l), "extraordinary moneys" means monetary contributions or loan payments in excess of those contractually required under the policy or certificate of life insurance.

(m) The proceeds of any claim for loss, destruction, or damage and the avails of any fire or casualty insurance payable because of loss, destruction, or damage to any property which would have been exempt under this article to the extent of the exemptions incident to such property;

(n) The proceeds of any claim for damages for personal injuries suffered by any debtor except for obligations incurred for treatment of any kind for such injuries or collection of such damages;

(o) The full amount of any federal or state income tax refund attributed to an earned income tax credit or any child tax credit, whether as a refundable tax credit or as a nonrefundable reduction in tax;

(p) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;

(q) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to, an award under a crime victim's reparation law;

(r) For purposes of garnishment proceedings pursuant to article 54.5 of this title 13, any amount held by a third party as a security deposit, as defined in section 38-12-102 (6), or any amount held by a third party as a utility deposit to secure payment for utility goods or services used or consumed by the debtor or the debtor's dependents;

(s) Property, including funds, held in or payable from any pension or retirement plan, deferred compensation plan, and health savings accounts, including those in which the debtor has received benefits or payments, has the present right to receive benefits or payments, or has the right to receive benefits or payments in the future and including pensions or plans that qualify under the federal "Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974", as amended; any employee pension benefit plan, as defined in 29 U.S.C. sec. 1002; any individual retirement account, as defined in 26 U.S.C. sec. 408; any Roth individual retirement account, as defined in 26 U.S.C. sec. 408A; and any plan, as defined in 26 U.S.C. sec. 401, and as these plans may be amended from time to time;

(t) All property which is subject to a judgment against a debtor for failure to pay state income tax to a state for periods when such individual was not a resident of such state on benefits received from a pension or other retirement plan;

(u) Any court-ordered domestic support obligation or payment, including a maintenance obligation or payment or a child support obligation or payment;

(v) Any claim for public or private disability benefits due, or any proceeds of such a claim, not otherwise provided for under law, up to five thousand dollars per month. Any claim or proceeds in excess of this amount is subject to garnishment in accordance with section 13-54-104.

(w) Up to two thousand five hundred dollars cumulative in a depository account or accounts in the name of the debtor.

(x) The debtor's aggregate interest in firearms and hunting and fishing equipment held for personal, family, or household use or for the personal safety of the debtor and members of the debtor's household, not to exceed one thousand dollars in value;

(y) (I) Any economic impact payment held by or payable to a debtor or to a debtor's dependents in any form.

(II) As used in this subsection (1)(y) and in subsection (3) of this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "economic impact payment" means a payment from a federal, state, or local government to a debtor or to a debtor's dependents to assist in managing the economic consequences of a national or statewide emergency or disaster. "Economic impact payment" includes:

(A) All economic impact and stimulus recovery payments to debtors pursuant to the federal "Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act", Pub.L. 116-136, as amended, or otherwise relating to the COVID-19 pandemic; and

(B) All other economic impact or stimulus recovery payments to debtors, which payments are authorized to assist with economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic or from any national or statewide emergency or disaster. It is the intent of the general assembly that this definition be interpreted in the broadest possible manner to protect such payments.

(z) All money placed into a life expectancy set-aside account or similar reserve fund, escrow, or impound account, which money is derived from reverse mortgage proceeds that are designated for use to pay for real estate property taxes; homeowner's hazard, flood, or other property insurance; or other home maintenance expenses.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (h) of subsection (1) of this section and section 13-54-104, military pensions shall be subject to court-ordered support of children or spouse.

(3) Notwithstanding subsections (1)(s) and (1)(y) of this section, any economic impact payment and any pension or retirement benefit or payment is subject to attachment or levy in satisfaction of a judgment taken for arrearages for child support or for child support debt, subject to the limitations in section 13-54-104.

(4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, all property of a person who has committed a felonious killing, as defined in section 15-11-803 (1)(b), C.R.S., and as determined in the manner described in section 15-11-803 (7), C.R.S., shall be subject to attachment or levy in satisfaction of a judgment awarded pursuant to section 13-21-201 or section 13-21-202 for such felonious killing.

(5) (a) As provided in the exception contained in 11 U.S.C. sec. 522 (f)(3), as amended, a debtor shall not avoid a consensual lien on property otherwise eligible to be claimed as exempt property.

(b) As used in this subsection (5), unless the context otherwise requires, "consensual lien" means a lien on property granted with the consent and approval of the owner.

(6) To the extent that exempt assets are commingled with nonexempt assets, a first-in first-out accounting shall be used to determine the portion of the commingled assets to which the exemption applies. If exempt assets are commingled with nonexempt assets as part of a single transaction, any amounts withdrawn from an account for the purpose of such transaction shall be assessed on a pro rata basis. This subsection (6) applies to all provisions of the Colorado Revised Statutes concerning the exemption of assets from seizure, except for exemptions that require segregation.

Source: L. 59: p. 530, § 2. CRS 53: § 77-13-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 77-2-2. L. 73: pp. 236, 915, 916, §§ 15, 1, 3. L. 75: (1)(o)(II) amended, p. 1466, § 6, effective July 18. L. 77: (1)(h) amended and (1.1) added, p. 811, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: Entire section R&RE, p. 893, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: (1)(r) added, p. 475, § 2, effective January 1, 1985. L. 85: (1)(j) amended, p. 580, § 1, effective April 30. L. 91: (1)(s) and (3) added, p. 383, §§ 1, 2, effective May 1. L. 92: (1)(t) added, p. 2241, § 1, effective June 6. L. 94: (1)(u) added, p. 1210, § 1, effective May 22. L. 95: (1)(l) amended, p. 723, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (4) added, p. 50, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), (1)(f), (1)(g), (1)(i), (1)(j)(I), (1)(j)(II)(A), (1)(k), and (1)(o) amended, p. 715, § 2, effective May 23. L. 2002: (1)(h.5) added, p. 587, § 11, effective May 24; (1)(s) amended, p. 487, § 1, effective May 24; (1)(g) amended, p. 1862, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(l)(I)(A) amended, p. 641, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2007: (1)(b), (1)(g), (1)(i), (1)(j), (1)(o), and (1)(u) amended and (1)(v) and (5) added, pp. 876, 877, §§ 3, 4, effective May 14; (1)(s) amended, p. 2026, § 27, effective June 1. L. 2010: (1)(l)(I)(A) amended, (SB 10-147), ch. 147, p. 507, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2015: (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(g)(I), (1)(i), (1)(j), (1)(l)(I)(A), and (1)(v) amended and (1)(l)(IV) added, (SB 15-283), ch. 301, p. 1237, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2017: (1)(l)(I)(A) amended, (HB 17-1093), ch. 57, p. 180, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2020: (1)(w) added, (SB 20-211), ch. 140, p. 610, § 3, effective June 29. L. 2021: (1)(w)(I) amended, (SB 21-002), ch. 7, p. 45, § 2, effective January 21; (1)(r) amended, (SB21-173), ch. 349, p. 2265, § 5, effective October 1. L. 2022: (1)(e), (1)(g), (1)(i), (1)(j)(I), (1)(j)(II)(A), (1)(o), (1)(s), (1)(u), (1)(v), (1)(w), and (3) amended and (1)(x), (1)(y), (1)(z), and (6) added, (SB 22-086), ch. 74, p. 377, § 6, effective April 7.

Cross references: (1) For specific exemptions for cemetery company property, see § 7-47-106; for workers' compensation benefits, see § 8-42-124; for employment security benefits, see § 8-80-103; for delinquent insurance company assets, see § 10-3-556; for group life insurance proceeds, see § 10-7-205; for fraternal benefit society insurance benefits, see § 10-14-403; for constitutional state officers' fees or salaries, see § 13-61-101; for family allowance from estate, see § 15-11-403; for public assistance payments, see § 26-2-131; for homestead exemptions, see part 2 of article 41 of title 38.

(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2007 act amending subsections (1)(b), (1)(g), (1)(i), (1)(j), (1)(o), and (1)(u) and enacting subsections (1)(v) and (5), see section 1 of chapter 226, Session Laws of Colorado 2007. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-211, see section 1 of chapter 140, Session Laws of Colorado 2020. For the legislative declaration in SB 22-086, see section 1 of chapter 74, Session Laws of Colorado 2022.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "The Widow's Allowance", see 6 Dicta 11 (1929). For article, "Some Phases of the Exemption Laws", see 12 Dicta 107 (1935). For article, "Executions and Levies on Tangible Property", see 27 Dicta 143 (1950). For note, "The Landlord's Lien in Colorado", see 27 Dicta 447 (1950). For note, "A Discussion of Garnishment and Its Exemptions", see 27 Dicta 453 (1950). For article, "Commercial Law", see 59 Den. L.J. 227 (1982). For article, "Legislative Update", see 11 Colo. Law. 2142 (1982). For article, "Secured Transactions — Part II: Default, Foreclosure and Bankruptcy", see 12 Colo. Law. 13 (1983). For article, "Exempting Retirement Benefits from Bankruptcy in Colorado", see 18 Colo. Law. 17 (1989). For article, "The Nuts and Bolts of Collecting Support", see 19 Colo. Law. 1595 (1990). For article, "Rights of the Debtor and Creditor to Retirement Plan Benefits", see 20 Colo. Law. 199 (1991). For article, "Recent Changes to Military Retirement Division in Divorce", see 47 Colo. Law. 34 (Apr. 2018).

Annotator's note. Since § 13-54-102 is similar to repealed CSA, C. 93, § 14, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing these provisions have been included in the annotations to § 13-54-102.

Constitutionality. This section does not violate the uniformity clause of § 8 of art. I, U.S. Const., or the supremacy clause, art. VI, cl. 2, U.S. Const. In re Parrish, 19 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).

On its face this section clearly applies to all writs of execution, regardless of underlying claim. Packard v. Packard, 33 Colo. App. 308, 519 P.2d 1221 (1974).

The only exception is specified in § 13-54-103, which denies exemptions if the writ of execution issues on a judgment for the purchase price of the property exempted. Packard v. Packard, 33 Colo. App. 308, 519 P.2d 1221 (1974).

The purpose of exemption is to preserve to the debtor his means of support. Watson v. Lederer, 11 Colo. 577, 19 P. 602 (1888); Smith v. Pueblo Mercantile & Credit Ass'n, 82 Colo. 364, 260 P. 109 (1927).

And to preserve the home for the family. Repeated decisions are to the effect that the purpose of these statutes is to preserve the home for the family, and, to that end, to protect it from alienation by one spouse without the concurrence of the other, and also from execution or attachment arising from any debt, contract, or civil obligation. In re Youngstrom, 153 F. 98 (8th Cir. 1907).

Exemptions are to be liberally construed. The exemption laws of the state are for the benefit of residents, and they are to be liberally construed. Sandberg v. Borstadt, 48 Colo. 96, 109 P. 419 (1910).

As indicated in the constitution. The liberal policy of this state in regard to exemption laws is indicated by the organic law. Section 1 of art. XVIII, Colo. Const., expressly declares that "the general assembly shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws". The decisions of the courts should be in harmony with this policy. Martin v. Bond, 14 Colo. 466, 24 P. 326 (1890); Hawkins v. Mosher, 8 Colo. App. 31, 44 P. 763 (1896).

Exemptions provided by this section for the purposes intended are favored. A perversion of the statute to admit of fraudulent purposes should be avoided by the courts; however, a construction so strict as to defeat its purpose and design should not prevail. Penrose v. Stevens, 100 Colo. 83, 65 P.2d 697 (1937).

This section relates solely to civil actions. Enderman v. Alexander, 68 Colo. 110, 187 P. 729 (1920).

The statutory right to an exemption is personal and individual, and must be exercised in relation to the property of the individual claiming it. McCrimmon v. Linton, 4 Colo. App. 420, 36 P. 300 (1894).

Right cannot be exercised in respect to partnership property. McCrimmon v. Linton, 4 Colo. App. 420, 36 P. 300 (1894).

Exemptions apply to the estate of a mental incompetent. The exemption provisions of this section are applicable to the assets in the estate of a mental incompetent, and insurance proceeds in such an estate are exempt from an approved claim of the Colorado state hospital. State v. Estate of Butler, 30 Colo. App. 246, 491 P. 2d 102 (1971).

Benefits received by individuals at state mental hospital from veterans administration and the Colorado old age pension program may be applied to cover costs of care at the hospital under former § 27-12-104 and therefore are not exempt under this section. In re Estate of Nau, 183 P.3d 626 (Colo. App. 2007).

While property may be exempt from levy, there is no statute which exempts it from liens. Noxon v. Glaze, 11 Colo. App. 503, 53 P. 827 (1898).

Exemption can be claimed only from levy and sale upon execution or attachment. As the common-law process of distress for rent does not exist in this state, it is only from levy and sale upon execution or attachment that exemption can be claimed. Replevin on the ground of exemption will lie only where property has been seized by execution or attachment. The statute exempting property from levy does not exempt it from a landlord's lien. Noxon v. Glaze, 11 Colo. App. 503, 53 P. 827 (1898).

Cognovit waiving exemptions is invalid. Colorado has held that a stipulation in a cognovit note which waived the right of exemption was invalid as against public policy. In re Rade, 205 F. Supp. 336 (D. Colo. 1962).

General waiver. A general waiver of "any and all exemptions permitted by law" in a promissory note is invalid as against public policy. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Colo. v. Schmuhl, 713 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1986).

Implied waiver. Combined note and security agreement result in an implied waiver of $6000 residential mobile home exemption. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Colo. v. Schmuhl, 713 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1986).

An ordinary chattel mortgage given on property which is later claimed as exempt will prevail over the exemption. In re Rade, 205 F. Supp. 336 (D. Colo. 1962).

Exemption applicable to judgment for arrearages in child support and alimony. The exemption from levy under writ of execution set forth in subsection (1)(j) applies to a judgment for arrearages in child support and alimony. Packard v. Packard, 33 Colo. App. 308, 519 P.2d 1221 (1974).

The exemption would apply only to the debtor's equity. When mortgaged property is claimed as exempt by a bankrupt, the exemption applies to the equity and not to the specific items of property. In re Cummings, 413 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1969); Centennial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schmuhl, 690 P.2d 882 (Colo. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Colo. v. Schmuhl, 713 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1986); In re Holcomb, 54 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).

Vendor's assignee cannot resort to exempt property to satisfy judgment. If the vendor takes a promissory note for the property sold, and transfers the note to a third party, such voluntary transfer of the note does not carry with it to the assignee the right to resort to exempt property to satisfy a judgment which he as assignee may recover upon the note. Whether the heir or personal representative of a deceased vendor would succeed to the privilege of his decedent under the proviso statute was not involved in the controversy in Weil v. Nevitt, 18 Colo. 10, 31 P. 487 (1892).

Garnishment of former spouse's pension as indemnification for tax liability is not precluded by subsection (1)(s) exempting pension funds from levy and sale under writ of attachment or execution in "any action" brought after a specified date where relevant action was dissolution, not motion to compel payment of tax. In re Plank, 881 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1994).

Applied in First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 652 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1982).

II. EXEMPT PROPERTY.

A. In General.

B. Agriculture.

C. Household Goods.

D. Stock in Trade.

E. Motor Vehicles.

F. Pensions and Retirement Plans.

G. Life Insurance.

H. Income Tax Refund.

I. Personal Injury Damages.

A. In General.

The application of the amended Colorado exemption limits set forth in this section to a loan and security agreement that was entered into prior to the enactment of the amended exemption statute does not constitute a "retrospective" application of state law in violation of art. II, § 11, of the Colorado Constitution and § 2-4-202. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

The application also does not constitute an unconstitutional "taking" of the loan collateral under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the state of Colorado. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

The application also does not violate the respective "contracts" clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

Notwithstanding the exemption created by subsection (1)(a), public policy prevents the application of an attorney's charging lien against funds owing to a parent as child support. In re Etcheverry, 921 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1996).

Wife is not a "single person" within meaning of this section and she is not entitled to any claims for exemption as a "single person". In re Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348 (D. Colo. 1979).

Where husband and wife file separately for bankruptcy, both the husband and the wife are entitled to the exemptions provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) of subsection (1). In re Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348 (D. Colo. 1979).

Subsection (1)(f) permits but one claim for exemption and where the trustee had allowed that claim in the computation of the assets available for the creditors of the husband, the wife's claim for a similar exemption was disallowed. In re Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348 (D. Colo. 1979).

Debtor may claim exemptions under subsection (1)(g) and (1)(i) on the same property. In re Case, 66 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

And each debtor can claim the full amount of the exemption under both subsection (1)(g) and (1)(i) as these are personal exemptions belonging to each debtor on personalty. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

"Implements" are defined in Anderson's Law Dictionary to be: "Things necessary to any trade, without which the work cannot be performed". Eckman v. Poor, 38 Colo. 200, 87 P. 1088 (1906).

Damages for personal injuries includes damages recovered in actions for breach of warranty, fraud, deceit, or false imprisonment as well as damages for loss of consortium. In re Keyworth, 47 B.R. 966 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).

But excludes damages under the wrongful death act unless the claim was for damages for personal injury suffered by the debtor and punitive damages since they are awarded not because of personal injury but because of malicious, wanton, and reckless actions. In re Keyworth, 47 B.R. 966 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).

The exemption for damages for personal injury does not apply to punitive damages that are awarded to punish the wrongdoer and not to compensate the plaintiff for injury. Miller v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections, Inc., 932 P.2d 824 (Colo. App. 1996).

Subsection (1)(n) does not protect the net proceeds of a personal injury judgment from garnishment for child support obligation. The plain language of § 13-54-106 clearly permits the garnishment of otherwise exempt property or income for the collection of child support arrearages. Drachmeister v. Brassart, 93 P.3d 566 (Colo. App. 2004).

Subsection (1)(o)(II) exemption for mobile home. Under subsection (1)(o)(II), each debtor in a joint case in bankruptcy is entitled to an exemption for a mobile home used as a place of residence and of which each debtor is an owner. In re Janesofsky, 22 B.R. 973 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).

Moneys from federally guaranteed student loan in student's bank account are exempt from garnishment for judgment based on antecedent business debt owed by student. Schaerrer v. Westman Comm'n Co., 769 P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1989).

Funds of defendant were not exempt from garnishment even though those funds were derived from a federal court order requiring defendant to make restitution as a part of a criminal case. Newburn v. RFB Petroleum, Inc., 775 P.2d 93 (Colo. App. 1989).

Where a non-custodial parent owes a duty of child support, such parent may not offset that obligation against a personal judgment that the non-custodial parent may have against the custodial parent. Hall v. Hall-Stradley, 776 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1989).

Exemption for jewelry was denied where debtor failed to provide court with current market value of specific items. In re Raymond, 132 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).

Debtor's annuity was not a life insurance policy for purposes of exemption under subsection (1)(l). In re Raymond, 132 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).

Because the statute has no restrictive conditions, the term "avails" in subsection (1)(l) includes the cash surrender value of life insurance policies. In re Griese, 172 B.R. 336 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994) (decided prior to 1995 amendment to subsection (1)(l)).

An adoption expense credit is not an earned income tax credit and, therefore, does not qualify as exempt property under subsection (1)(o). Earned income is not an element of eligibility for the adoption expense credit. Subsection (1)(o) refers to the very unique tax credit program that is based upon earned income. It does not create a generic exemption for all tax credits that use income as a qualifying factor. In re Walsh, 298 B.R. 894 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003).

Attorney's charging lien may attach to an award of spousal maintenance. Because the language of the attorney's lien statute is unambiguous, the levy exception for maintenance payments in this section is irrelevant to whether such payments fall within the scope of § 12-5-119. Samuel J. Stoorman & Assocs. v. Dixon, 2017 CO 42, 394 P.3d 691.

B. Agriculture.

Debtors engaged in agriculture as their principal occupation where they began trucking to save their farming business, a business that had been a way of life for each of them and for at least three generations for each of their families; they began trucking with reluctance; debtor wife steadfastly resisted driving a truck but finally did so only as a last resort to save the farming business; it is fairly common for farmers and ranchers in the area to take on employment outside of the family farm for at least part of the year in order to supplement farm income and pay bills; most, if not all, of the income from trucking was dedicated to paying the bills related to the family and its farming and ranching business; both debtors expressed a credible and sincere intent to return to working full-time as farmers/ranchers once they were able to get back on their feet financially; and, while they drove trucks approximately 40 hours per week, they and their children also continued to raise cattle and manage the farm in their spare time. The debtors can, therefore, claim exemptions under subsection (1)(g). In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

Debtors' remaining livestock are in the nature of breeding stock, without which it would be virtually impossible for debtors to obtain a fresh start. The stock is therefore exempt from levy as "tools of the trade" under subsection (1)(g). In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

C. Household Goods.

Ownership interest required before exemption may be claimed. Each Colorado debtor in a joint case is entitled to claim up to $1,500 a piece in household goods or tools of trade; however, the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before any exemption may be claimed. In re Ferguson, 15 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re Reeder, 60 B.R. 312 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).

Where husband and wife are two separate debtors in a joint petition in bankruptcy, under subsection (1)(e), each is entitled to claim a $1,500 exemption for a total exemption of $3,000 for household goods. In re Alvarez, 14 B.R. 940 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).

Where husband and wife file separately for bankruptcy, both the husband and the wife are entitled to the exemptions provided in paragraphs (c) and (e) of subsection (1). In re Hellman, 474 F. Supp. 348 (D. Colo. 1979).

Subsection (1)(e) exemption superior to nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest. A nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in debtors' household goods and household furnishings under § 522 (f) of the federal bankruptcy code, is void to the extent that it impairs the exemption to which the debtors would be entitled under subsection (1)(e) if no security interest existed. Redin v. Fid. Fin. Servs., 14 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re Weiss, 51 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).

Guns do not constitute household goods when primarily used as recreational items. In re Greenlee, 61 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).

Tractor qualified as a household good because it was necessary to the functioning of the household. In re Sarmiento, 363 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).

D. Stock in Trade.

Debtor may claim exemptions under subsection (1)(g) and (1)(i) on the same property. In re Case, 66 B.R. 44 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

And each debtor can claim the full amount of the exemption under both subsection (1)(g) and (1)(i) as these are personal exemptions belonging to each debtor on personalty. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

Debtor may claim an exemption for "tools of the trade" in his personal bankruptcy when the debtor conducts his business operations through a wholly owned corporation. In re Calderon, 501 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013).

The tools are owned by debtor in his individual capacity and are used and kept by him for purposes of carrying on a gainful occupation, that is, his masonry business. The fact that debtor uses and keeps the tools in relation to work performed through his wholly owned corporation, in itself, does not affect debtor's right to a personal exemption under § 13-54-107. In re Calderon, 501 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013).

The words "stock in trade", in subsection (1)(i), apply to the merchant or shopkeeper, as well as to the mechanic, and include the stock of goods kept on sale by the merchant. Weil v. Nevitt, 18 Colo. 10, 31 P. 487 (1892).

Therefore it includes liquors of a saloonkeeper. Weil v. Nevitt, 18 Colo. 10, 31 P. 487 (1892).

Debtors may claim exemptions under subsection (1)(i) where evidence demonstrated that equipment was not only used by the debtors in their farming and ranching operations but was an integral part of those operations. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

The phrase "gainful occupation" requires at least some aspect of profitability. In re Sharp, 508 B.R. 457 (10th Cir. 2014).

In order to disqualify a debtor's claimed tools of trade exemption, the objecting party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor's occupation is unlikely to contribute to the support of the debtor and the debtor's family in any significant way within a reasonable period of time under the specific facts of each case. In re Sharp, 508 B.R. 457 (10th Cir. 2014).

The phrase "gainful occupation" means the principal work or business for which a person receives compensation or profit, not reimbursement for the role of foster parent. In re Sedillo, 476 B.R. 619 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).

Under the plain meaning of subsection (1)(i), debtor's role as a foster parent does not qualify for the claimed exemption of a motor vehicle used by debtor to transport foster children to necessary everyday activities. In re Sedillo, 476 B.R. 619 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).

A debtor may claim a motor vehicle as exempt pursuant to subsection (1)(i) so long as the vehicle qualifies for the exemption. In re Van Winkle, 265 B.R. 247 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002); In re Black, 280 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002).

Debtor entitled to claim truck as exempt equipment pursuant to subsection (1)(i) where debtor used and kept the truck for the specific purpose of carrying on debtor's occupation. In re Van Winkle, 265 B.R. 247 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2002).

Debtor entitled to claim motor vehicle under subsection (1)(i) where debtor used the vehicle to carry on a gainful occupation. In re Sackett, 394 B.R. 544 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008).

Failure to make selection under this section is waiver of right. A defendant in attachment, claiming under subsection (1)(i), of "implements or stock in trade used or kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business", not specifically exempt by law, is entitled to select such articles as are suitable to his trade or business; and a failure on his part to make such selection, is a waiver of his right thereto. Behymer v. Cook, 5 Colo. 395 (1880).

Property subject to levy and sale under § 13-54-103 cannot become exempt under subsection (1)(i). Behymer v. Cook, 5 Colo. 395 (1880).

Exemption for stock in trade cannot exceed statutory limit. The supreme court of Colorado has made statements indicating it would not exempt a tool or instrument, or stock in trade, exceeding the value set by the statute. Watson v. Lederer, 11 Colo. 577, 19 P. 602 (1888).

E. Motor Vehicles.

Law reviews. For article, "Exemption of Automobiles from Levy Under Execution or Attachment", see 10 Dicta 143 (1933). For note, "The Status of an Automobile Under the Exemption Laws of Colorado", see 10 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 269 (1938).

Subsection (1)(j) provides for an exemption where the debtor uses a motor vehicle for carrying on any gainful occupation. In re Rade, 205 F. Supp. 336 (D. Colo. 1962).

Legal title to an automobile is not a requirement of subsection (1)(j)(I). Subsection (1)(j)(I) allows a debtor to exempt one or more motor vehicles kept and used by the debtor. Hill v. Koching, 338 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005).

Use of vehicle on public highways is not a requirement of subsection (1)(j)(I). In re Sarmiento, 363 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).

Debtors entitled to claim tractor as exempt motor vehicle. In re Sarmiento, 363 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).

The application of subsection (1)(j)(II)(A) is expressly limited to debtors who are themselves elderly or disabled and not to a debtor who keeps and uses a motor vehicle for the purpose of obtaining medical care for a disabled dependent. In re Coleman, 208 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).

Debtor's son's manic-depressive mental condition was not disabling under subsection (1)(j)(II)(A) where there was no evidence or offer of proof of any inability of the son to maintain gainful employment. In re Coleman, 208 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).

For evidence supporting ruling that automobile was not exempt, see Law v. Simon, 110 Colo. 545, 136 P.2d 520 (1943).

F. Pensions and Retirement Plans.

Subsection (1)(s) applies only to original actions, writs of garnishments, issued by a court on or after May 1, 1991. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Intern. Ass'n, Local 9, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993).

And the exemption does not apply in any action for dissolution of marriage in which the petition was filed before May 1, 1991. In re LeBlanc, 944 P.2d 686 (Colo. App. 1997).

Plain meaning of "retirement plan" is not limited to plans that possess attributes of ERISA-qualified or tax-qualified plans. A future retirement obligation by company is therefore exempt from attachment or garnishment under subsection (1)(s). Dillabaugh v. Ellerton, 259 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2011).

Health savings account is not a "retirement plan" as contemplated by subsection (1)(s). The plain meaning of "retirement plan" is a plan intended to provide an income to a person after that person retires from a career. Comm'l Research, LLC v. Roup, 2013 COA 163, 353 P.3d 859, aff'd, 2015 CO 38, 349 P.3d 273.

A custodial individual retirement account (IRA) is not a separate legal entity. It is only a receptacle for a person's assets that enjoys certain tax attributes and is subject to certain tax penalties. But the assets held in the receptacle remain the assets of the individual owner. Assets in a debtor's IRA are property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate that may be exempted if the conditions of applicable state or federal exemption statutes are satisfied. In any suit involving these assets, the individual owner is the real party in interest. Thus, the custodian of the IRA is not a proper defendant to recover allegedly preferential payments on a promissory note. In re Lakeview Dev. Corp., 614 B.R. 603 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020).

Subsection (1)(s) is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) because it imposes limitations not imposed by ERISA on a spouse's right to receive retirement plan funds under a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). Court may use a QDRO to satisfy husband's unpaid obligations relating to the dissolution of marriage, including those for child support, maintenance, and attorney fees and, doing so, does not violate the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA or the internal revenue code. Further, a QDRO issued for this purpose does not result in an improper modification of the property division provisions of the decree. In re Drexler, 2013 COA 43, 315 P.3d 179.

Funds in a savings account that were the balance remaining from a lump-sum distribution from a retirement account are not exempt under subsection (1)(s). In re Gordon, 791 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2015).

G. Life Insurance.

Statute exempts from garnishment the "cash surrender value" of a life insurance policy up to $25,000. In re Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d 677 (Colo. App. 1999).

The exclusion from the exemption is the only garnishable or attachable asset, measured by the incremental increases in "cash value" occasioned by the making of contributions to the policy through payment of premiums. In re Gedgaudas, 978 P.2d 677 (Colo. App. 1999); In re Moosman, 473 B.R. 385 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).

If on the date of bankruptcy a debtor's life insurance policy has a cash surrender value equal to or less than the amount debtor's contributions during the prior four years have increased the cash value of the policy, the entire cash surrender value is non-exempt. In re Moosman, 473 B.R. 385 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012).

H. Income Tax Refund.

The nonrefundable portion of the child tax credit of 26 U.S.C. § 24(a) is not exempt property under subsection (1)(o) of this section and therefore is not exempt from a bankruptcy estate because it does not constitute a payment under the internal revenue code and thus cannot give rise to a refund. In re Borgman, 698 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2012).

The refundable portion of the child tax credit is property of the bankruptcy estate to the extent attributable to the pre-petition portion of the taxable year in question. In re Garcia-Morales, 653 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2023), aff'd, 664 B.R. 180 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 151 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2025) (all decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

To the extent an exemption applies, a debtor may remove exempt property from the estate. In re Garcia-Morales, 653 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2023), aff'd, 664 B.R. 180 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 151 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2025) (all decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

The phrase "attributed to" in subsection (1)(o) should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, requiring the simple and traditional standard of but-for causation. If the refundable credit were removed from the tax equation, would the refund amount be different? If so, there is a but-for cause. In re Garcia-Morales, 653 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2023), aff'd, 664 B.R. 180 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 151 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2025) (all decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

Here, removing the refundable credit would eliminate the debtor's federal refund. The refundable credit is a but-for cause of debtor's refund, and the causation requirement of the exemption statute is satisfied. The refund is attributed to the refundable credit. In re Garcia-Morales, 653 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2023), aff'd, 664 B.R. 180 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 151 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2025) (all decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

The refundable credit debtor received, the child tax credit, thus falls within the exemption of subsection (1)(o). Subsection (1)(o) exempts "[t]he full amount of any ... refund". Giving effect to the term "full" requires a determination that a debtor's tax refund is exempt up to the amount of the exempt refundable credit received. In re Garcia-Morales, 653 B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2023), aff'd, 664 B.R. 180 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 151 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2025) (all decided under law in effect prior to the 2022 amendment).

I. Personal Injury Damages.

Net proceeds from a personal injury claim should generally be included in the calculation of a debtor's projected disposable income. In re Adamson, 615 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2020).