Colorado § 13-40-113 - Answer of defendant - additional and amended pleadings.

§ 13-40-113. Answer of defendant - additional and amended pleadings.

(1) (a) The defendant shall file with the court, at or before the day specified for the defendant's appearance in the summons, an answer in writing. The defendant's answer must set forth the grounds on which the defendant bases the defendant's claim for possession, admitting or denying all of the material allegations of the complaint, and presenting every defense that then exists and upon which the defendant intends to rely, either by including the same in the defendant's answer or by simultaneously filing motions setting forth each defense.

(b) If the defendant asserts by motion that the defendant did not timely file an answer in writing because the defendant is a victim-survivor of unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse and did not receive or have a reasonable opportunity to review the summons and complaint or the defendant was otherwise unable to appear, the court shall relieve the defendant from final judgment and vacate any judgment or writ of restitution that may have been issued and provide the defendant with a reasonable amount of time, no less than seven days, to submit an answer to the complaint.

(2) The court for good cause may permit the filing of additional and amended pleadings if it will not result in a delay prejudicial to the defendant. If the defendant asserts a defense described in section 13-40-104 (4)(a), the court shall permit the filing of additional and amended pleadings.

(2.5) A defendant may assert as an affirmative defense to a proceeding under this article 40 that the landlord violated or is in violation of a provision of part 5 of article 34 of title 24.

(3) A defendant does not waive any defense related to proper notice by filing an answer pursuant to this section. A defendant can raise a defense related to proper notice in the defendant's answer or by filing a motion prehearing. A defendant cannot raise this defense for the first time at the hearing if the defendant failed to raise it in the defendant's answer or in a prehearing motion.

(4) After an answer is provided to the court pursuant to this section:

(a) The court shall set a date for trial no sooner than seven days, but not more than ten days, after the answer is filed, unless the defendant requests a waiver of the requirement in the defendant's answer or after filing an answer; except that a court may extend beyond ten days if either party demonstrates good cause for an extension, if the court otherwise finds justification for the extension, or if a party participating remotely pursuant to section 13-40-113.5 was disconnected and unable to reestablish connection. The requirement set forth in this subsection (4)(a) does not apply to a forcible entry and detainer petition that alleges a substantial violation, as defined in section 13-40-107.5 (3), or terminates a tenancy pursuant to section 38-12-203 (1)(f), unless the alleged substantial violation or termination of tenancy is a result of unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse, provided that the court has been made aware that the tenant is a victim-survivor.

(a.5) If a defendant in an action filed pursuant to this article 40 asserts a defense described in section 13-40-104 (4)(a) and requests an extension of a scheduled trial date, the court shall find good cause exists to extend the trial date beyond ten days after the answer is filed and shall make all reasonable efforts to schedule the trial date to accommodate any safety concerns raised by the defendant requesting the extension.

(b) In the time after an answer is filed and before a trial occurs, the court shall order that the landlord or tenant provide any documentation relevant to the current action that either party requests pursuant to section 13-40-111 (6)(b).

(c) The court shall provide any party who opted to participate remotely with necessary information to facilitate such participation. The information must include a phone number and email address for the court and instructions on what to do in the event remote participation is disrupted.

Source: L. 1885: p. 227, § 12. R.S. 08: § 2612. C.L. § 6378. CSA: C. 70, § 13. CRS 53: § 58-1-13. L. 55: p. 406, § 2. L. 61: p. 392, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 58-1-13. L. 2021: Entire section amended, (SB 21-173), ch. 349, p. 2263, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2023: (2.5) added, (SB 23-184), ch. 402, p. 2413, § 6, effective August 7; (4)(a) amended and (4)(c) added, (HB 23-1186), ch. 415, p. 2460, § 5, effective January 1, 2024. L. 2025: (1), (2), and (4)(a) amended and (4)(a.5) added, (HB 25-1168), ch. 229, p. 1055, § 10, effective May 22.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1186, see section 1 of chapter 415, Session Laws of Colorado 2023. For the legislative declaration in HB 25-1168, see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.

ANNOTATION

Structure of forcible entry and detainer (F.E.D.) statute evinces a legislative intent to accelerate trial settings in order to provide expeditious remedy. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985).

Due process is satisfied so long as F.E.D. statute permits continuances in cases requiring intensive trial preparation. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985).

Defendant failing to file answer admits allegations of complaint. A defendant, by failing to file an answer to the complaint in an unlawful detainer action, admits the allegations therein contained. Feste v. People, 93 Colo. 206, 25 P.2d 177 (1933).

A defendant in an unlawful detainer action who fails to answer within the required time thereby admits the allegations set forth in the complaint. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157, 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

Failure to answer results in default judgment. Failure of defendant in a county court proceeding for F.E.D. to file a timely answer in writing properly results in a default judgment against him. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157, 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

If no answer is filed, there is no issue to be tried. In an unlawful detainer action where a written complaint is filed in compliance with § 13-40-110, if defendant fails to file a written answer, there is no issue to be tried, and defendant is in default in both original and appellate courts, if an appeal be taken from a judgment against him. Fort v. Demmer, 91 Colo. 285, 14 P.2d 489 (1932).

Where defendant's answer admits possession, plaintiff need not prove it. In an action of F.E.D., where the defendant in her answer admits possession, it is not necessary for plaintiff to prove possession. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).

Answers held insufficient. An answer denying that plaintiff gave defendant an option to purchase the premises and that defendant was to pay a specified sum, and denying that defendant had forfeited any rights to the property by virtue of an option to purchase the same, or otherwise, allegations of such facts appearing in the complaint, was held insufficient. Bonnell v. Gill, 41 Colo. 59, 92 P. 13 (1907).

Answer in a F.E.D. action stating mere conclusions is insufficient under this section. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899); McCrimmon v. Raymond, 77 Colo. 81, 234 P. 1058 (1925).

An answer merely denying that defendants took possession by force was held not compliance with this section. Kenney v. Daugherty, 67 Colo. 56, 185 P. 471 (1919).

Motion for bill of particulars is not provided for in this section, and it does not constitute an answer because it fails to admit or deny the material allegations. Spar Consol. Mining & Dev. Co. v. Aasgaard, 33 Colo. App. 35, 516 P.2d 127 (1973), aff'd, 185 Colo. 157, 522 P.2d 726 (1974).

A defendant as such is not barred from denying a plaintiff's title, but it is a tenant who is not allowed to deny the landlord's title. The latter relation must exist to apply the rule. The plaintiff may allege that the defendant is a tenant and introduce evidence to prove it, but that is not conclusive upon the defendant. The latter may go forward and prove that he never was a tenant, but a purchaser or mortgagor in possession, for instance, and, for that reason, entitled to remain. Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 171, 125 P. 522 (1912).

Defendant may set up defense that he is a mortgagor. In an action of wrongful detainer by landlord against tenant, the defendant may set up as a defense that he is the owner in equity of the premises, and the plaintiff, though invested with the title, a mere mortgagee. And he may prove such relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, thus disproving the relation of landlord and tenant, averred in the complaint. The rule that the tenant may not deny the landlord's title has no application. Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 171, 125 P. 522 (1912).

Equitable defenses may be interposed in actions of F.E.D. Adcock v. Lieber, 51 Colo. 373, 117 P. 993 (1911); McCrimmon v. Raymond, 77 Colo. 81, 234 P. 1058 (1925).

A tenant may raise a landlord's alleged violation of the Colorado Fair Housing Act as an affirmative defense to a F.E.D. action. Miller v. Amos, 2024 CO 11, 543 P.3d 393.

Defendant may offer all facts entitling him to possession at law or equity. All the substantial facts upon which a defendant relies, entitling him to the possession of the property, include such facts as will entitle him to the possession at law or in equity. Adcock v. Lieber, 51 Colo. 373, 117 P. 993 (1911).

Fact that possessor did not know plaintiff's residence is no defense. The allegation in the answer that defendant was not able to surrender and deliver up to plaintiff possession of the premises described in the demand, because she was not acquainted with him, and did not know his place of residence, constitutes no defense at all. No livery of seisin was necessary, and all that was necessary for defendant to have done in order to have complied with the demand was to have vacated the premises. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).

Section does not require pleading of evidence. The provision of this section that the answer shall set forth "all the substantial facts", does not require the pleading of evidence. W.H. Swanson Theater Co. v. Pueblo Opera Block Inv. Co., 70 Colo. 83, 197 P. 762 (1921).