Colorado § 13-40-106 - Written demand.

§ 13-40-106. Written demand.

(1) The demand or notice required by section 13-40-104 or 38-12-1303 shall be made in writing, specifying the grounds of the demandant's right to the possession of the premises, including a specific description of the alleged violation or no-fault eviction grounds, describing the premises, and indicating the date and time when the premises shall be delivered up, and shall be signed by the person claiming such possession, the person's agent, or the person's attorney.

(2) The demand or notice required by section 13-40-104 or 38-12-1303 must also include a statement that a residential tenant who receives supplemental security income, social security disability insurance under Title II of the federal "Social Security Act", 42 U.S.C. sec. 401 et seq., as amended, or cash assistance through the Colorado works program created in part 7 of article 2 of title 26 has a right to mediation prior to the landlord filing an eviction complaint with the court pursuant to section 13-40-110.

(3) The demand or notice required by section 13-40-104 or 38-12-1303 must be written in English, Spanish, or any other language that the landlord knows, or has reason to know, is the primary language of the tenant.

(4) If the demand or notice required by section 13-40-104 or 38-12-1303 includes a demand for unpaid rent, the demand or notice must include a statement that if the tenant has experienced unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse that has caused the tenant to miss a rent payment, the tenant may provide the landlord with documentation of the unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse and is entitled to a repayment plan that allows the tenant to repay the unpaid rent over a period of time not to exceed nine months.

Source: L. 1885: p. 226, § 5. R.S. 08: § 2605. C.L. § 6371. CSA: C. 70, § 6. CRS 53: § 58-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 58-1-6. L. 2023: Entire section amended, (HB 23-1120), ch. 414, p. 2454, § 4, effective June 6. L. 2024: Entire section amended, (HB 24-1098), ch. 113, p. 362, § 4, effective April 19. L. 2025: (4) added, (HB 25-1168), ch. 229, p. 1052, § 3, effective August 6.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 23-1120, see section 1 of chapter 414, Session Laws of Colorado 2023. For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1098, see section 1 of chapter 113, Session Laws of Colorado 2024. For the legislative declaration in HB 25-1168, see section 1 of chapter 229, Session Laws of Colorado 2025.

ANNOTATION

The Colorado supreme court has recognized the rule requiring a demand for rent due prior to the exercise of the right of reentry. Lessor, before he exercises the right of reentry reserved for breach of covenant to pay rent, must make an actual demand of the amount of rent due, in strict compliance with the requirements of the common law. Whenever a forfeiture for the nonpayment of rent is to be established, it is necessary to prove such a demand. Audubon Commercial Area Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 268 F. Supp. 883 (D. Colo. 1967).

Demand must be in writing and left with the party. A demand, formal according to all of the requirements of the law, and set out in writing, if read to the party, is not sufficient. It must be made in writing and left with the party or it is no demand. Doss v. Craig, 1 Colo. 177 (1869).

A party cannot be guilty of wrongful detainer until after this demand has been made upon him. Doss v. Craig, 1 Colo. 177 (1869).

A distinction in respect to necessity of demand exists between action for forcible entry, and action for unlawful detainer after a peaceable and lawful entry. Farncomb v. Stern, 18 Colo. 279, 32 P. 612 (1893).

No demand is necessary where entry was forcible. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, where the entry complained of was forcible and illegal, the plaintiff need not make a demand for the possession of the premises before commencing his action. Farncomb v. Stern, 18 Colo. 279, 32 P. 612 (1893).

Demand may be signed by an agent or attorney. This section expressly provides that the demand for possession may be signed by the agent or attorney of the person claiming such possession. Ensley v. Page, 13 Colo. App. 452, 59 P. 225 (1899).

Sufficiency of notice cannot be questioned in appellate court when due service was conceded. Where, in wrongful detainer by landlord against tenant, the latter concedes, in the court below, due service of notice to quit, he will not be heard to question the sufficiency of the notice upon error. Hepp Wall Paper & Mercantile Co. v. Deahl, 53 Colo. 274, 125 P. 491 (1912).

Omission to make demand is not cured by plea of title in defendant or by verdict. In an action for unlawful detainer under this section the plaintiff must aver and prove a demand in writing for possession of the premises which he seeks to recover, and the omission to make such demand is not cured by plea of title in defendant nor by verdict. Doss v. Craig, 1 Colo. 177 (1869).

The common-law necessity for a demand of rent may be obviated by a provision in the lease or by the acts of the parties. Audubon Com. Area Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 268 F. Supp. 883 (D. Colo. 1967).