Colorado § 13-32-105 - Docket fees in criminal actions.

§ 13-32-105. Docket fees in criminal actions.

(1) (a) At the time of the first appearance of the defendant in all criminal actions in all courts of record, except the county court, court of appeals, and the supreme court, there shall be charged against the defendant a total docket fee of thirty dollars, which shall be payable upon conviction of the defendant. In county courts, the total docket fee in criminal actions shall be eighteen dollars, which shall be payable by the defendant upon conviction. These fees shall cover all clerks' fees prior to judgment.

(b) On and after June 6, 2003, the docket fee in all criminal actions in all courts of record, except the county court, court of appeals, and the supreme court, is increased by five dollars, and the docket fee in county court criminal actions is increased by three dollars. The additional revenue generated by the docket fee increases shall be transmitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the state commission on judicial performance cash fund created in section 13-5.5-115.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1), on and after July 1, 2008, all fees collected under this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6).

(2) Repealed.

(3) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective until July 1, 2027.] Pursuant to section 13-1-204 (1)(b), a five-dollar surcharge shall be assessed and collected on each docket fee described in this section concerning criminal convictions entered on and after July 1, 2007.

(3) [Editor's note: This version of subsection (3) is effective July 1, 2027.] Beginning July 1, 2027, the court shall collect, on behalf of the court security authority, the court security surcharge described in section 13-1-505 on each docket fee specified in this section in the amount of ten dollars. The court shall transmit the court security surcharge in the manner specified in section 13-1-505 (2).

Source: L. 1891: p. 201, § 3. R.S. 08: § 2528. C.L. § 7878. CSA: C. 66, § 8. CRS 53: § 56-5-5. L. 58: pp. 246, 249, §§ 11, 19, 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 56-5-5. L. 64: p. 467, § 7. L. 69: p. 389, § 6. L. 75: (1) amended, p. 579, § 2, effective July 1. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 788, § 2, effective January 1, 1978. L. 79: (2) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 563, § 7, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 379, § 2, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 1405, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1) amended, p. 2671, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2007: (3) added, p. 1269, § 5, effective May 25; (1)(c) added, p. 1536, § 23, effective May 31. L. 2008: (1)(c) amended, p. 2146, § 17, effective June 4. L. 2017: (1)(b) amended, (HB 17-1303), ch. 331, p. 1780, § 3, effective August 9. L. 2026: (3) amended, (HB 26-1422), ch. 331, p. 1958, § 22, effective July 1, 2027.

Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1) by House Bill 91-1108 and House Bill 91-1187 were harmonized.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending subsection (1)(c), see section 1 of chapter 417, Session Laws of Colorado 2008.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933).

Right to require deposit. This section provides that clerks of courts may require a deposit in advance on account of fees. Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Colo. 381, 176 P. 479 (1918).

Deposit may be waived. If the right to require a deposit in advance on account of fees is not insisted upon at the proper time, the officer must be understood to have waived it, and to have consented that such fees shall abide the result of the suit. Cunningham v. Quinn, 12 Colo. 473, 21 P. 488 (1889).

Provision for deposit is permissive only and not mandatory. The language, "may require in advance, on account of their fees a deposit of five dollars", appearing in the last paragraph of the section, seems to be permissive only and not mandatory. Plainly the sum is not in payment of any specific fee, but is a deposit on account of all fees in the case. It is a general statute and applies to all cases alike, and to all fees in all courts of record. Wigton v. Wigton, 69 Colo. 19, 169 P. 133 (1917); Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Colo. 381, 176 P. 479 (1918).

Payment of the deposit is not jurisdictional but is to be treated as penal in its nature, and for such reason, it is held that while this deposit may be required as a condition precedent, yet such payment may be waived by express action of the clerk as in this case. Wigton v. Wigton, 69 Colo. 19, 169 P. 133 (1917).

Docketing the case without fee is immaterial. The fact that the clerk, in any particular case, chooses to docket the cause without collecting the docket fee in advance, is not material. Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Colo. 381, 176 P. 479 (1918).

And is no ground for remanding the case. The clerk of the district court could refuse to docket a case until the docket fee was paid, but having actually docketed the case without first obtaining the docket fee the result is the same, so far as the appellee in the district court is concerned, as if the docket fee had been paid; and the cause cannot be remanded simply on the ground that the fee had not been paid. Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Colo. 381, 176 P. 479 (1918).

An appeal may, so far as this section is concerned, be perfected without paying the docket fee. Provided the clerk actually dockets the case within the prescribed time, a rule of court cannot be so enforced or construed as to nullify the clerk's docketing of the case, simply because the clerk acted without collecting the docket fee. Drennen v. Johnson, 65 Colo. 381, 176 P. 479 (1918).

Mandamus lies after tender of fees. It being admitted that the clerk's legal fees for the services desired have been tendered him the rule that mandamus lies to compel the performance of purely ministerial duties is applicable. Cunningham v. Quinn, 12 Colo. 473, 21 P. 488 (1889).

Payment of docket fees does not violate principles of double jeopardy. Costs are not a form of punishment but are essentially civil and are not traditionally considered to be punishment, and the imposition of costs generally does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. People v. McQuarrie, 66 P.3d 181 (Colo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds in Yeadon v. People, 2020 CO 38, 462 P.3d 1087, and Waddell v. People, 2020 CO 39, 462 P.3d 1100.

A district court has no authority to collect the fee imposed pursuant to subsection (1) after the completion of a deferred sentence and dismissal of the underlying charges. Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, 403 P.3d 160.