Colorado § 13-1-125 - Service of process.

§ 13-1-125. Service of process.

(1) Service of process upon any person subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant or respondent outside this state, in the manner prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, with the same force and effect as if the summons had been personally served within this state.

(2) No service of any summons or other process upon any corporation shall be made outside the state in the manner provided in subsection (1) of this section when such corporation maintains an agent for process upon whom service may be made as provided in rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

(3) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process as prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

Source: L. 65: p. 472, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-27. L. 82: p. 280, § 2.

Cross references: For the manner of service, see C.R.C.P. 4.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

II. Proper Service.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law — 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For article, "Jurisdiction and Service of Process Beyond Colorado Boundaries", see 11 Colo. Law. 748 (1982). For article, "Legislative Activities in Family Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 1560 (1982).

This section and § 13-1-124 are sometimes referred to as the "long arm" or "single act" statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966).

Purpose of sections was to extend the court's jurisdiction. These sections were passed by the general assembly in order to extend, rather than to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

Section may be used even when cause arose before effective date. This section and § 13-1-124 may be constitutionally applied where the complaint is filed after the effective date of the statute, though the tortious act complained of occurred before the effective date of the statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966).

Retrospective application of this section is in accord with sound public policy. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).

For discussion of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, see Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).

Applied in Nations Enters, Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980); Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983).

II. PROPER SERVICE.

Transacting of business may not be proved unless process is properly served. Since respondents did not serve process on a foreign corporation by personal service as required by the "long arm" statute, its provisions concerning contacts sufficient to establish doing business are inapplicable under § 7-9-119. Geer Co. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 48, 469 P.2d 734 (1970).

It is improper to dismiss a complaint because of improper or invalid service of process. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966).

Quashing of process is not reviewable by writ of error. An order quashing a purported service of process is not tantamount to a judgment of dismissal and under our rules is not such an order as is subject to review by writ of error. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966).

Process must be served on defendant at usual place of abode. The fact that the serviceman's usual place of abode was not the place of service is sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the prima facie showing made by the sheriff's return and that the service must therefore be set aside. Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445, 422 P.2d 627 (1967).

Term "usual place of abode" is not necessarily synonymous with domicile. The term "usual place of abode" has generally been construed to mean the place where that person is actually living at the time service is attempted. It is not necessarily synonymous with "domicile". Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445, 422 P.2d 627 (1967).

For necessity of process being served by proper person, see Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 177 Colo. 261, 493 P.2d 1093 (1972).

Process will not be quashed for lack of jurisdiction if plaintiff makes prima facie showing. Where plaintiff makes prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction in complaint, process is not vulnerable to motion to quash based upon lack of jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).