Colorado § 10-4-619 - Coverage compulsory.

§ 10-4-619. Coverage compulsory.

(1) Every owner of a motor vehicle who operates the motor vehicle on the public highways of this state or who knowingly permits the operation of the motor vehicle on the public highways of this state shall have in full force and effect a complying policy under the terms of this part 6 covering the said motor vehicle, and any owner who fails to do so shall be subject to the sanctions provided under sections 42-4-1409 and 42-7-301, C.R.S., of the "Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act". This section shall not apply to persons who hold a current and valid certificate of self-insurance pursuant to section 10-4-624.

(2) An insurer shall not refuse to provide benefits to an insured on the basis that the insured is a volunteer for a fire department and is injured in a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency.

Source: L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2433, § 2, effective June 5; entire section added, p. 1560, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2004: Entire section amended, p. 895, § 3, effective May 21.

Editor's note: This section was originally numbered as § 10-4-616 in House Bill 03-1188 but has been renumbered on revision for ease of location.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. Since this section is similar to § 10-4-705 as it existed prior to the 2003 repeal of part 7 of article 4 of this title, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

Act generally covers claims arising from automobile accidents between private person and public entity. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995).

Vehicles operating out of the normal traffic flow on highways, roads, or other places, are exempt, as are their owners, from the compulsion of the statute. Smith v. Simpson, 648 P.2d 677 (Colo. App. 1982), overruled on other grounds in Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (1984).

Coverage is compulsory even though the owner does not have knowledge of or give permission to each individual who drives the car. Bukulmez v. Hertz Corp., 710 P.2d 1117 (Colo. App. 1985); aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. in Blue Cross of W. New York v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987).

The provisions of this section and § 10-4-706 do not mandate a minimum coverage for every policy. Rather, the purpose of these statutes is to impose upon motor vehicle owners a mandated level of insurance coverage for their vehicles. Since the insurer limited its total liability under all three identical vehicle insurance policies to the requisite statutory minimum and since each policy therefore complied with the insured's statutory obligation, there was no conflict with this section and § 10-4-107. Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Ekeroth, 791 P.2d 1220 (Colo. App. 1990).

In-state insurers are not excluded from having to provide the minimum coverages required of out-of-state insurers. Ortiz v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 971 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1998).

Court declined to read in a primacy requirement to the compulsory coverage mandated by this section. Neither case law nor current statutory law requires compulsory coverage under this section to be treated as primary. To the contrary, § 10-4-623 states that an owner's compulsory coverage "may be subject to conditions and exclusions that are not inconsistent with the requirements" of the relevant statutes. Further, former § 10-4-707 (4) shows that the general assembly knows how to identify primary coverage. Hence, the omission of such a provision in this section cannot be dismissed as inadvertent. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011).

Nor is there any compelling public policy basis for reading a primary-insurer requirement into the statutory scheme. The public policy behind Colorado's mandatory-insurance laws only requires that the public benefit from insurance coverage, not that any insurer be primary. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011).

Nor does industry custom compel the vehicle owner's insurer be primary. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011).

Insureds and insurers are not prohibited from determining by contract what coverages are primary and what coverages are excess as to compulsory coverage. Accident victims are equally protected by compulsory coverage that is primary or multiple coverages that are co-primary. Thus, there is no need to abrogate the freedom of contract between insureds and insurers regarding primacy of coverages. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011).

Insurance policy's "excess clause", which made coverage secondary to other collectible insurance, was not void as an erosion of the statutory mandate that vehicle owners carry minimum liability insurance. Court contrasted excess clause, which limited coverage to the extent that other coverage existed, with "escape clause", whereby an insurer provides no coverage if other insurance applied. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011).

Exclusion in insurance policy for bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured does not violate the mandatory liability insurance statute or the state's public policy. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (D. Colo. 2010).

Motor vehicle liability coverage may be limited to the operation of specified vehicles. Scott v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 141 F.4th 1151 (10th Cir. 2025).

And public policy favors allowing insurers to extend liability coverage only to specified vehicles. Scott v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (D. Colo. 2024), aff'd, 141 F.4th 1151 (10th Cir. 2025).

Where insureds gave the keys to their truck to the driver and informed him that he could drive the truck to work without asking for further permission, the driver had the initial permission of the insureds necessary to trigger the insurance protection required by the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act. Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1996).

Initial permission from the primary insured to use the vehicle is all that is required to confer coverage under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act. Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1996).

Applied in Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 264, 592 P.2d 397 (1979); In re United States Court of Appeals v. Criterion Ins. Co., 198 Colo. 132, 596 P.2d 1203 (1979); Golting v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 43 Colo. App. 337, 603 P.2d 972 (1979).