Colorado § 1-40-120 - Filing in federal court.

§ 1-40-120. Filing in federal court.

In case a complaint has been filed with the federal district court on the grounds that a petition is insufficient due to failure to comply with any federal law, rule, or regulation, the petition may be withdrawn by the two persons designated pursuant to section 1-40-104 to represent the signers of the petition and, within fifteen days after the court has issued its order in the matter, may be amended and refiled as an original petition. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the timely filing of a protest to any original petition, including one that has been amended and refiled. No person shall be entitled, pursuant to this section, to amend an amended petition.

Source: L. 93: Entire article amended with relocations, p. 689, § 1, effective May 4.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 1-40-109 (2)(b) as it existed prior to 1993.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The provision that a rejected petition for the initiation of a measure may be refiled "as an original petition" after amendment is to be construed, not that it must be refiled within the statutory time fixed for the initial filing of such petitions, but after being refiled it is to be considered "as an original petition". Brownlow v. Wunch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938).

Former section, which provided that a rejected petition may be amended and refiled as an original, did not subject a cured petition to the deadline set forth in Colo. Const. art. V, § 11 (2). Montero v. Meyer, 795 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1990) (decided under law in effect prior to 1989 amendment).

But where a petition for the initiation of a constitutional amendment is filed within the time fixed by statute, in the event of protest and rejection, the sponsors, at their election, are entitled to refile the petition when amended within the fifteen days allowed by this section. Brownlow v. Wunch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938).

This is true even though the refiling date may fall beyond the six-month period fixed by § 1-40-104 for the filing of original petitions. Brownlow v. Wunch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938).

And there is no statutory authorization for a protest against the filing, or refiling after withdrawal, of a petition, to initiate a measure under the initiative and referendum. Brownlow v. Wunch, 102 Colo. 447, 80 P.2d 444 (1938).

Moreover, when a petition to initiate a measure under initiative and referendum is once withdrawn, it passes from official control and may be tampered with, amended, or destroyed. Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932); Brownlow v. Wunch, 102 Colo. 447, 80 P.2d 444 (1938).

If the petition is withdrawn, no review can thereafter be prosecuted because without the petition no court could adjudicate its sufficiency. Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932).

And an action to review an order of the secretary of state declaring a referendum petition insufficient cannot be left standing until the petition is amended and refiled, and later tried on an issue which did not exist when the cause was instituted. Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932).

An action for review cannot survive a withdrawal to be further prosecuted on amendment and refiling because if refiled it comes back "as an original petition". Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932).

Therefore, the withdrawal of such a petition is equivalent to the dismissal of an action to review. Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932).

And a demand for its withdrawal and a suit in mandamus to enforce that demand must necessarily have the same effect. Robinson v. Armstrong, 90 Colo. 363, 9 P.2d 481 (1932).