Colorado § 42-2-124 - When court to report convictions.

§ 42-2-124. When court to report convictions.

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided, whenever any person is convicted of any offense for which this article makes mandatory the revocation or suspension of the driver's or minor driver's license of such person by the department, the court in which such conviction is had shall require the offender to immediately surrender such driver's or minor driver's license or any instruction permit to the court at the time of conviction, and the court shall, not later than ten days after such conviction, forward the license to the department, together with a record of such conviction on the form prescribed by the department. Any person who does not immediately surrender such person's license or permit to the court commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense, unless such person swears or affirms under oath administered by the court and subject to the penalties of perjury that the license or permit has been lost, destroyed, or is not in said person's immediate possession. Any person who swears or affirms that the license or permit is not in the immediate possession of said person shall surrender said license or permit to the court within five days of the sworn or affirmed statement, and if not surrendered within such time, said person commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.

(b) Whenever the driver's history of any person shows that such driver is required to maintain financial responsibility for the future and is unable to show to the court that the driver is maintaining the required financial responsibility for the future, the court shall require the immediate surrender to it of the driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit held by such person, and the court, within forty-eight hours after receiving the license, shall forward the license to the department with the form prescribed by the department.

(2) Every court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under this article or any other law of this state regulating the operation of motor vehicles on highways and every military authority having jurisdiction over offenses substantially the same as those set forth in section 42-2-127 (5) which occur on a federal military installation in this state shall forward to the department a record of the conviction of any person in said court or by said authority for a violation of any said laws not later than ten days after the day of sentencing for such conviction and may recommend the suspension or retention of the driver's, minor driver's, or temporary driver's license or any instruction permit of the person so convicted.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the term "convicted" or "conviction" means a sentence imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury, or an adjudication of a delinquency under title 19, C.R.S. The payment of a penalty assessment under the provisions of section 42-4-1701 shall also be considered a conviction if the summons states clearly the points to be assessed for that offense. Whenever suspension or revocation of a license is authorized or required for conviction of any offense under state law, a final finding of guilty of a violation of a municipal ordinance governing a substantially equivalent offense in a city, town, or city and county shall, for purposes of such suspension or revocation, be deemed and treated as a conviction of the corresponding offense under state law. A stay of sentence, pending appeal, shall not deprive the department of the authority to suspend, revoke, or deny a driver's or minor driver's license pending any final determination of a conviction on appeal.

(4) An expungement of an adjudication of delinquency shall not result in a rescission of the revocation or suspension of the driving privilege unless said expungement is a result of a reversal of the adjudication on appeal.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2131, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (4) amended, p. 1538, § 6, effective July 1. L. 98: (4) amended, p. 1436, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1), (2), and (3) amended, p. 1352, § 23, effective July 1, 2001. L. 2002: (1)(a) and (4) amended, p. 1585, § 17, effective July 1. L. 2004: (4) amended, p. 1131, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2005: (3) and (4) amended, p. 646, § 14, effective May 27.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-2-121 as it existed prior to 1994, and the former § 42-2-124 was relocated to § 42-2-132.

Cross references: For collateral attacks of traffic convictions, see §§ 42-4-1702 and 42-4-1708.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Drinking and Driving: An Update on the 1989 Legislation", see 18 Colo. Law. 1943 (1989).

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-124 is similar to § 42-2-121 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1 and to § 13-4-21 as it existed prior to its repeal in 1963, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Primary purpose of this section and §§ 42-2-122 and 42-2-123 is to protect the public safety upon the highways. Heil v. Charnes, 44 Colo. App. 225, 616 P.2d 980 (1980).

This section imposes a duty upon the courts of the state to forward records of convictions for traffic offenses to the division of motor vehicles. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Due process standard for using penalty assessment as conviction. Through the provisions of subsection (3), the general assembly has mandated a minimum standard of due process which must be followed before payment of a penalty assessment may be used as a conviction for purposes of suspension or revocation of a driver's license pursuant to § 42-2-123 (1)(a). Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

The term "convicted" is specifically defined by statute as meaning "a sentence imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a verdict of guilty by the court or a jury." Rogers v. Dept. of Rev., 841 P.2d 369 (Colo. App. 1992).

Number of assessed points on summons deemed minimum standard of due process. The requirement that the number of points to be assessed be stated in the summons is a minimum standard of due process established by the general assembly and applies to a municipal summons when a fine was paid before the municipal traffic violations bureau. Dunn v. Tice, 43 Colo. App. 55, 598 P.2d 530 (1979).

Failure of penalty assessment to contain statement of number of points to be assessed for a traffic violation in no way invalidates the penalty assessment, or a guilty plea entered thereon. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Inadequate notices. Where there is no statement in the penalty assessment notices advising defendant that his signature and payment of the fine constitute a plea of guilty or an acknowledgment of guilt, the notices do not comply with the mandatory requirements of this section, and defendant's acceptance of the notices in the form tendered and his payment of the fines stated therein may not be considered a conviction for which points may be assessed. Cave v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 31 Colo. App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972).

The records of the division of motor vehicles prepared in accordance with the statutory requirements are to be presumed correct. Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971).

Court must state points assessable before guilty plea. A traffic violation conviction is insufficient for the purpose of assessing points against the licensee where municipal court summons fails to state the number of points which could be assessed upon a plea of guilty. Dunn v. Tice, 43 Colo. App. 55, 598 P.2d 530 (1979).

When points not assessable. If a traffic violation does not appear on the summons, and the offender is not advised by the arresting officer in reference to the points chargeable for the traffic violation, points cannot be assessed against him for that offense. Stortz v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978).

Factors considered in suspension of motorist's license. The department of revenue did not err in considering both the municipal court conviction and the traffic points resulting therefrom in determining whether the motorist's license should be suspended, the length of that suspension, and whether a probationary license should be granted. Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979).

Question of the validity of this section was ripe for determination where court stayed its surrender of defendant's license pending appeal after convicting defendant of drug use under § 18-18-406. People v. Smith, 944 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1997).

Applied in Purcell v. Tomasi, 43 Colo. App. 540, 608 P.2d 844 (1980).