Colorado § 27-65-113 - Jurisdiction - transfer.

§ 27-65-113. Jurisdiction - transfer.

(1) (a) The court in which a petition or certification is filed pursuant to this article 65, or a court authorized to conduct proceedings pursuant to this article 65 that receives a court order transferring jurisdiction of a civil commitment pursuant to section 16-8.5-118, is the court of original jurisdiction and of continuing jurisdiction for any further proceedings pursuant to this article 65.

(b) When the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be promoted by a change in the court having jurisdiction, the court may order a transfer of the proceeding to another county. Until further order of the transferee court, if any, it is the court of continuing jurisdiction. If multiple criminal courts refer a matter for proceeding pursuant to section 27-65-201 or 27-65-108.5, any court with jurisdiction may transfer the proceeding to another county and allow for consolidation of proceedings into one proceeding, which may occur in any county that promotes the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.

(2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (2), any petition, certification, transfer of jurisdiction of a civil commitment, or request for a proceeding may be filed where the respondent resides or is physically present for treatment.

(b) A request for appointment of an attorney or for proceedings pursuant to section 27-65-104 regarding voluntary treatment of a minor to which the minor objects may be filed in the jurisdiction where the minor is hospitalized.

(c) A petition or request for a proceeding regarding an emergency mental health hold ordered pursuant to section 27-65-106 or certification for short-term treatment ordered pursuant to section 27-65-109 may be filed in the jurisdiction where the respondent resides, was physically present and transported for an emergency mental health hold, or is currently in an inpatient setting receiving treatment.

(d) A petition or request for a proceeding regarding certification for short-term treatment for incompetent defendants in a criminal matter pursuant to section 27-65-108.5 or a civil commitment pursuant to section 27-65-201 may be filed in the jurisdiction where the respondent resides, was physically present immediately prior to the filing of the petition, or is receiving inpatient treatment or where the criminal court that referred the matter is located.

(3) (a) In the event that a respondent or a person who is ordered committed pursuant to section 16-8.5-118, or is being supervised in a commitment pursuant to section 27-65-201, or is found not guilty by reason of impaired mental condition pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), or by reason of insanity pursuant to section 16-8-105 (4) or 16-8-105.5, refuses to accept medication, the court having jurisdiction of the action pursuant to subsection (1) of this section; the court committing the person or defendant to the custody of the department pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), 16-8-105 (4), or 16-8-105.5; or the court of the jurisdiction in which the designated facility treating the respondent or person is located has jurisdiction and venue to accept a petition by a treating physician and to enter an order requiring that the respondent or person accept the treatment or, in the alternative, that the medication be forcibly administered to the respondent or person. The court of the jurisdiction in which the designated facility is located shall not exercise its jurisdiction without the permission of the court that committed the person to the custody of the department. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall appoint an attorney, if one has not been appointed, to represent the respondent or person and hear the matter within ten days.

(b) In any case brought pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section in a court for the county in which the treating facility is located, the county where the proceeding was initiated pursuant to subsection (1) of this section or the court committing the person to the custody of the department pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), 16-8-105 (4), or 16-8-105.5 shall either reimburse the county in which the proceeding pursuant to this subsection (3) was filed and in which the proceeding was held for the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the proceeding or conduct the proceeding itself using its own personnel and resources, including its own district or county attorney, as the case may be.

(c) In the case of a defendant who is found incompetent to proceed pursuant to section 16-8.5-103 and who refuses to accept medication, the jurisdiction for the petition for involuntary treatment procedures is as set forth in section 16-8.5-106.

(4) In any case in which there has been a change of venue to a county other than the county of residence of the respondent or the county in which the certification proceeding was commenced, the county from which the proceeding was transferred shall either reimburse the county to which the proceeding was transferred and in which the proceeding was held for the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the proceeding or conduct the proceeding itself using its own personnel and resources, including its own district or county attorney, as the case may be.

(5) If a civil proceeding was initiated pursuant to this article 65 or transferred pursuant to section 16-8.5-118 but the proceeding is no longer proper because the court determined that the respondent has an intellectual and developmental disability or a neurocognitive disorder, as those terms are defined in section 25.5-10-501, without any other mental health disorder, the court may maintain jurisdiction by ordering the case to proceed pursuant to article 10 of title 25.5.

Source: L. 2022: Entire article amended with relocations, (HB 22-1256), ch. 451, p. 3193, § 1, effective August 10. L. 2023: (5)(a) and (5)(b) amended, (HB 23-1236), ch. 206, p. 1066, § 38, effective May 16; (1), (5)(a), and (5)(b) amended, (HB 23-1138), ch. 423, p. 2491, § 16, effective July 1, 2024. L. 2026: Entire section amended, (SB 26-149), ch. 142, p. 748, § 15, effective May 21.

Editor's note: The provisions of this section are similar to former § 27-65-111 as it existed prior to 2022. For a detailed comparison, see the comparative tables located in the back of the index.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Commitment Procedures in Colorado", see 29 Dicta 273 (1952). For article, "New Legislation Concerning the Mentally Disabled", see 11 Colo. Law. 2131 (1982). For article, "Respect for the Values and Preferences of Mental Patients: The Medina Trilogy", see 11 Colo. Law. 3014 (1982). For article, "The Clinton Mental Health Case — A Civil Procedure Lesson", see 19 Colo. Law. 1809 (1990).

Annotator's note. Since § 27-65-113 is similar to former § 27-65-113, to § 27-65-111 as it existed prior to the 2022 amendments to this article, and to laws antecedent to that section, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Involuntary commitment to mental hospital is deprivation of liberty which the state cannot accomplish without procedural safeguards. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to civil commitment proceedings. Due process does not require that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination be extended to Colorado's civil commitment proceedings. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Former §§ 27-10-111 (1) and 27-10-107 (3), read together, clearly and unambiguously grant a right to a jury hearing to a person being certified for short-term treatment. People in Interest of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918 (Colo. App. 1993).

The right to effective assistance of counsel applies to proceedings conducted under § 16-8.5-112 and subsection (5)(c) of this section. People in Interest of Uwayezuk, 2023 COA 69, 537 P.3d 377.

The term "danger" in subsection (1) does not offend due process as long as the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the individual's mental illness results in a present danger to herself or others or renders her gravely disabled. People v. Stevens, 761 P. 2d 768 (Colo. 1988).

Standard of proof meets minimum standards of procedural due process. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Less restrictive alternatives need not be considered as a condition precedent to certification. Civil commitment constitutes a severe infringement of liberty requiring due process protection. However, the statutory scheme set forth in this article contains a number of procedural safeguards that greatly reduce the inherent risk of erroneous deprivation. Therefore, due process does not require a mandatory hearing at the time of certification since the statute provides for a hearing on request. People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).

"Clear and convincing evidence", required by subsection (1), is evidence which is stronger than a preponderance of the evidence, and which is unmistakable and free from serious or substantial doubt. People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978).

Where three medical experts testified at the certification hearing that appellant was potentially dangerous to herself or to others, there was clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable basis to believe that appellant's mental illness resulted in a present danger to herself or others, thereby satisfying the prerequisite conditions for short-term certification pursuant to former § 27-10-107. People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1988).

The need for electroconvulsive therapy for a person involuntarily committed must be established by clear and convincing evidence. People in Interest of M.K.M., 765 P.2d 1075 (Colo. App. 1988).

If it is shown that person is mentally ill, short-term involuntary commitment cannot be justified unless it is shown that, as a result of such illness, the person is: (1) a danger to others; (2) a danger to himself; (3) "gravely disabled" because of an inability to take care of basic personal needs; or (4) "gravely disabled" because the person is "making irrational or grossly irresponsible decisions concerning his person and lacks the capacity to understand this is so". People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Mere disability alone is insufficient to warrant involuntary commitment. Mere disability alone, even if found in conjunction with mental illness, is not enough to warrant involuntary commitment. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Dangerousness to others may be shown by evidence of injurious acts, attempts, or threats. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Dangerousness to oneself may be shown by similar evidence, where the individual's injurious behavior is directed toward himself. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Passive injury to oneself, because of an inability to take care of one's most basic personal needs, may be as dangerous or damaging to the individual as the active threat posed by suicide. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Former § 27-10-107 requires that a causal nexus be established between a person's mental illness and the condition of being a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980).

Uncorroborated psychiatric opinion sufficient. In some cases, a psychiatric opinion, not corroborated by evidence of recent dangerous conduct, may constitute "clear and convincing evidence" of dangerousness, and therefore may be sufficient to sustain a commitment based on dangerousness. People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978).

Right of indigent appellant to transcript at state expense. An indigent appellant in a mental health proceeding for involuntary confinement and treatment has a right under the due process guarantees of the United States and Colorado constitutions to a transcript at state expense. Goedecke v. State Dept. of Insts., 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979).

Stringent release standards reasonably related to public safety. The more stringent standards of release applicable to the criminally committed defendant reflect the increased risk to the public associated with the release decision, and, as in the case of automatic commitment, they are reasonably related to the state's interest in public safety. People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981).

Court order required for administering medication to incompetent absent his consent. Absent an emergency situation calling for immediate action (in which event the least intrusive means should be used by the physician to meet the emergency), antipsychotic medication shall not be administered to a mentally incompetent institutionalized patient who has not given his consent to this medication unless ordered by a court following a proper hearing. People in Interest of Medina, 662 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 1982), aff'd, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985); People v. Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843 (Colo. App. 1992).

Test in People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985), for forcibly administering medication applies equally to a forcible increase in medication dosage. The second Medina element requires a patient to be deteriorating, which does not mean the same thing as "not improving". A patient who is simply not improving will not satisfy the Medina test for forcible administration of medication. People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, 364 P.3d 499.

The statutory authorization to forcibly administer medication related to mental illnesses does not grant the state unlimited authority to administer any medical treatment or medication, even if the four Medina factors are satisfied. The involuntary chemical castration of a person committed by the state to the care of the state hospital by virtue of his mental illness may only be authorized by the general assembly through statute, which it is not. People in Interest of C.J.R., 2016 COA 133, 409 P.3d 536.

The possibility that a certain medication may no longer be an effective treatment, or may not be taken voluntarily, at some unspecified time in the future is insufficient to justify the entry of an order authorizing the immediate administration of multiple other medications. As such, the people failed to meet the burden set forth under People in Interest of Medina. People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, 451 P.3d 1229.

"Ten days" in subsection (5) means ten total days, not ten business days, for the purpose of determining a hearing date to certify short-term treatment and involuntary medication administration. People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, 541 P.3d 1198.

For presence of respondent at hearing, see Isham v. People, 82 Colo. 550, 262 P. 89 (1927).

For reopening of proceedings under earlier provisions, see Wood v. Throckmorton, 26 Colo. 248, 57 P. 699 (1899); Ex parte Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 172 P. 1068 (1918); People ex rel. Best v. County Court, 110 Colo. 249, 132 P.2d 799 (1942); In re People in Interest of Hill, 118 Colo. 571, 198 P.2d 450 (1948).

Assistant county attorney is absolutely immune from suit concerning her actions and omissions related to the fulfillment of her statutory obligation pursuant to former subsection (5) to conduct commitment proceedings once the petition for a 72-hour evaluation has been submitted. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000).

Applied in Sisneros v. District Court, 199 Colo. 179, 606 P.2d 55 (1980); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).