Colorado § 18-3-411 - Sex offenses against children - limitation for commencing proceedings - evidence - statutory privilege - definition.

§ 18-3-411. Sex offenses against children - limitation for commencing proceedings - evidence - statutory privilege - definition.

(1) As used in this section, "unlawful sexual offense" means:

(a) Enticement of a child, as described in section 18-3-305; sexual assault, as described in section 18-3-402, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen years of age; sexual assault in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-402, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen years of age; sexual assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-403 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(g), or (1)(h), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen years of age, or as described in section 18-3-403 (1)(e), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim; unlawful sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(f), or (1)(g), when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen years of age; sexual assault in the third degree, as described in section 18-3-404 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(f), or (1)(g), as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, when the victim at the time of the commission of the act is a child less than fifteen years of age; sexual assault on a child, as described in section 18-3-405; sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, as described in section 18-3-405.3; aggravated incest, as described in section 18-6-302; human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude, as described in section 18-3-504 (2); sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403; procurement of a child for sexual exploitation, as described in section 18-6-404; indecent exposure, as described in section 18-7-302; soliciting for commercial sexual activity with a child, as described in section 18-7-402; pandering of a child, as described in section 18-7-403; procurement of a child, as described in section 18-7-403.5; keeping a place of commercial sexual activity with a child, as described in section 18-7-404; pimping of a child, as described in section 18-7-405; inducement of commercial sexual activity with a child, as described in section 18-7-405.5; engaging in commercial sexual activity with a child, as described in section 18-7-406; class 3 or class 4 felony internet luring of a child, as described in section 18-3-306 (3); internet sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-3-405.4; unlawful electronic sexual communication, as described in section 18-3-418;

(b) Each of the following offenses, as they existed prior to July 1, 2026: Soliciting for child prostitution, in violation of section 18-7-402; keeping a place of child prostitution, in violation of section 18-7-404; inducement of child prostitution, in violation of section 18-7-405.5; or patronizing a prostituted child, in violation of section 18-7-406; or

(c) Criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the acts specified in this subsection (1).

(2) No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for a misdemeanor offense specified in section 18-3-402 or 18-3-404, unless the indictment, information, complaint, or action for the same is found or instituted within five years after the commission of the offense. The limitation for commencing criminal proceedings and juvenile delinquency proceedings concerning unlawful sexual offenses that are felonies shall be governed by section 16-5-401 (1)(a), C.R.S.

(3) An out-of-court statement made by a child, as "child" is defined under the statutes that are the subject of the action, or a person under fifteen years of age if "child" is undefined under the statutes that are the subject of the action, describing all or part of an offense of unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), performed or attempted to be performed with, by, on, or in the presence of the child declarant, and that is not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule that provides an exception to the hearsay objection, may be admissible pursuant to section 13-25-129 (2).

(4) All cases involving the commission of an unlawful sexual offense shall take precedence before the court; the court shall hear these cases as soon as possible after they are filed.

(5) The statutory privilege between the husband and the wife shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution of an unlawful sexual offense.

(6) Prosecution for any incident of sexual contact constituting the offense or any incident of sexual contact constituting a pattern offense of sexual abuse pursuant to section 18-3-405 (2)(d) or 18-3-405.3 (2)(b) may be commenced and the offenses charged in an information or indictment in a county where at least one of the incidents occurred or in a county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed.

Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 313, § 1, effective July 1. L. 83: (3) added, p. 630, § 2, effective May 25; (4) and (5) added, p. 694, § 3, effective June 15. L. 85: (1) and (2) amended, p. 618, § 12, effective July 1. L. 88: (5) amended, p. 713, § 19, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) amended, p. 406, § 11, effective June 6. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 1717, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1) and (2) amended, p. 704, § 29, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2) amended, p. 1128, § 2, effective June 3. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 2056, § 8, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 413, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1) amended, (SB 10-140), ch. 156, p. 538, § 9, effective April 21. L. 2014: (1) amended, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1155, § 17, effective July 1, 2014. L. 2015: (3) amended, (HB 15-1183), ch. 96, p. 276, § 2, effective April 10. L. 2017: (6) added, (HB 17-1109), ch. 97, p. 293, § 4, effective April 4. L. 2019: (1) amended, (HB 19-1030), ch. 145, p. 1760, § 4, effective July 1; (3) amended, (SB 19-071), ch. 42, p. 145, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2026: (1) amended, (SB 26-015), ch. 335, p. 2040, § 21, effective July 1.

Cross references: (1) For provisions concerning child abuse that are similar to the provisions of this section, see § 18-6-401.1; for the husband-wife privilege, see § 13-90-107.

(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 26-015, see section 1 of chapter 335, Session Laws of Colorado 2026.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Review of New Legislation Relating to Criminal Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 2148 (1982). For article, "The Child Sex Abuse Case in the Courtroom", see 15 Colo. Law. 807 (1986).

Specific expression of legislative intent to apply 10-year statute of limitations to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 1979, overcomes presumption of prospective operation. People v. Midgley, 714 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1986).

Flat 10-year statute of limitations applies to offenses allegedly committed before June 3, 2002, due to an ambiguity created in the act enacting the 2002 amendments to this section. The general statutory construction rule of lenity requires that ambiguity in the meaning of a criminal statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant. Thus, effective date section of the 2002 enacting legislation stating that the act applies to offenses committed on or after passage of the act (June 3, 2002) is controlling despite July 1, 1992 date set forth in the substantive provisions of the statute. People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251 (Colo. 2009) (decided based upon statute as it existed at the time the alleged crimes were committed prior to 2006 amendments).

A defendant is absent from the state for statute of limitations purposes when he or she has been transferred by the department of corrections (DOC) to an out-of-state facility to serve out the remainder of a state sentence. People v. Butler, 2017 COA 117, 431 P.3d 643.

Applicable limitations period tolled while defendant was incarcerated by DOC in another state. Even though defendant was sent out of state by the DOC and the DOC maintained jurisdiction over him while he was in another state, he was, nonetheless, "absent" from the state. The general assembly did not include in the tolling provision, § 16-5-401 (2), language contemplating a defendant's reason for being out of the state, nor whether the defendant was out of the state voluntarily. People v. Butler, 2017 COA 117, 431 P.3d 643.

In prosecution for sexual assault, the prosecutor had obligation to provide defense counsel with a victim's prior, allegedly false, rape report because the rape report was highly probative of the victim's credibility as a witness. People v. Wilson, 678 P.2d 1024 (Colo. App. 1983).

No error in instructing jury that exact dates of two offenses charged need not be proved, where evidence clearly showed two different incidents, defendant was charged in connection with both, and neither could have occurred outside the applicable limitation period. People v. Bolton, 859 P.2d 303 (Colo. App. 1993).

A person with an out-of-state conviction for an offense comparable to sexual assault on a child in this state is not eligible to discontinue registration with this state's sex offender registry because a person who is convicted in this state of the same offense is not eligible to discontinue registration. Curtiss v. People, 2014 COA 107, 410 P.3d 539.

Applied in People v. Wood, 743 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1987); People v. District Court, 743 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1987).