Colorado § 18-1-202 - Place of trial - applicability.

§ 18-1-202. Place of trial - applicability.

(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, or in any other county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred.

(2) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is in one county and his victim is in another county at the time of the commission of an act constituting an element of the offense, the offense is committed and trial may be had in either of said counties.

(3) In a case involving the death of a person, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which the cause of death is inflicted, or in which death occurs, or in which the body of the deceased or any part of such body is found.

(4) Theft of property is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which he exercised control over the property.

(5) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the offense is committed and the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated.

(6) If an offense is committed in or upon any automobile, trailer, railroad car, aircraft, or other vehicle of transportation passing within or over this state, the offense is deemed to have been committed and the offender may be tried in any county through or over which the vehicle of transportation passed.

(7) (a) When multiple crimes are based upon the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode and are committed in several counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any one of the individual crimes could have been tried, regardless of whether or not the counties are in the same judicial district.

(b) (I) For purposes of this subsection (7), when a person commits one of the offenses listed in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b) on two or more occasions within a six-month period, it may be considered part of the same criminal episode. Nothing in this subsection (7) shall bar prosecution of an offense that could have been joined in another prosecution.

(II) The provisions of subsection (7)(b)(I) of this section apply to the following offenses:

(A) Theft, as defined in section 18-4-401;

(B) and (C) Repealed.

(D) Criminal mischief, as defined in section 18-4-501;

(E) Fraud by check, as defined in section 18-5-205;

(F) Defrauding a secured creditor or debtor, as defined in section 18-5-206;

(G) Failure to pay over assigned accounts, as defined in section 18-5-502;

(H) Concealment or removal of secured property, as defined in section 18-5-504;

(I) Failure to pay over proceeds, as defined in section 18-5-505;

(J) Unauthorized use of a financial transaction device, as defined in section 18-5-702;

(K) Cybercrime, as defined in section 18-5.5-102;

(L) Repealed.

(M) Trafficking in food stamps, as defined in section 26-2-306, C.R.S.;

(N) Unlawful use of a patient personal needs trust fund, as defined in section 25.5-6-206, C.R.S.;

(O) Repealed.

(P) Theft of a license plate, as described in section 42-5-104;

(Q) Theft in connection with assistive technology, as described in section 6-1-409, C.R.S.;

(R) Theft of farm products, as described in section 35-36-313;

(S) Fraud in connection with obtaining public assistance, as described in section 26-1-127, C.R.S.;

(T) Fraud in connection with obtaining food stamps, as described in section 26-2-305, C.R.S.;

(U) An offense described in part 1 of article 5 of this title;

(V) Forgery, as defined in sections 18-5-102 and 18-5-104; and

(W) Identity theft, as defined in section 18-5-902.

(c) (I) For an indictment or information that includes an offense described in article 5 of this title, the offender may be tried in a county where the offense occurred, in a county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred, or in a county where a bank, savings and loan, credit union, or government agency processed a document or transaction related to the offense.

(II) For the purpose of this section, "processed" means to physically handle a document or to make a written or electronic entry in a permanent or temporary record of the transaction, whether the entry is made manually or through automated means.

(8) An inchoate offense is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which any act which is an element of the offense, including formation of the agreement in conspiracy, is committed.

(9) When a person in one county solicits, abets, agrees, aids, or attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in another county, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried for the offense in either county, or in any other county in which the principal offense could be tried.

(10) When an offense is committed on the boundary line between two counties, or so close thereto as to be difficult to readily ascertain in which county the offense occurred, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried for the offense in either county.

(11) Proof of the county in which the offense occurred or which county is the proper place for trial pursuant to this section shall not constitute an element of any offense and need not be proven by the prosecution at trial unless required by the statute defining the offense. Any challenge to the place of trial pursuant to this section shall be made by motion in writing no later than twenty-one days after arraignment, except for good cause shown. The court shall determine any such issue prior to the commencement of the trial and the selection of a jury. If the court finds that trial is not proper in the county in which the charges were filed, the court shall transfer the case to a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the proper county. Failure to challenge the place of trial as provided in this subsection (11) shall constitute a waiver of any objection to the place of trial. Pursuant to section 16-12-102 (2), C.R.S., the prosecution may file an interlocutory appeal of a decision transferring the case to another county.

(12) If a person commits the offense of failure to register as a sex offender as provided in section 18-3-412.5, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried in the county in which the offender was released from incarceration for commission of the offense requiring registration, in the county in which the offender resides, in the county in which the offender completed his or her last registration, or in the county in which the offender is apprehended.

(13) If a person commits identity theft as described in section 18-5-902, identity theft is committed and the offender may be tried in any county where a prohibited act was committed, in any county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed, or in any county where the victim resides during all or part of the offense. For purposes of this subsection (13), a business entity resides in any county in which it maintains a physical location.

(14) (a) If a person commits sexual assault on a child as described in section 18-3-405 (1) and commits the offense as part of a pattern of sexual abuse as described in section 18-3-405 (2)(d), or commits sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as described in section 18-3-405.3 (1) and commits the offense as part of a pattern of sexual abuse as described in section 18-3-405.3 (2)(b), the offender may be tried for all acts:

(I) In a county where at least one of the acts constituting the offense or the pattern of sexual abuse was committed; or

(II) In a county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed.

(b) This subsection (14) takes effect on April 4, 2017, and applies to an act constituting a pattern of sexual abuse for which the offense's statute of limitations has not yet run on April 4, 2017.

(c) Nothing in this subsection (14) allows for a defendant to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same incident of sexual conduct involving a child that has been previously alleged as an incident necessary to form a pattern of sexual abuse as defined in section 18-3-401(2.5) in violation of the prohibition against second trials in sections 18-1-301, 18-1-302, and 18-1-303.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 391, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-202. L. 84: (10) added, p. 536, § 4, effective July 1. L. 87: (7) amended, p. 606, § 10, effective April 16. L. 92: (3) amended and (11) added, p. 402, § 12, effective June 3. L. 95: (12) added, p. 469, § 17, effective July 1. L. 98: (7) amended, p. 793, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2002: (12) amended, p. 1181, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2003: (7)(b)(II) amended and (7)(c) added, p. 976, § 15, effective April 17; (7)(b)(II)(S) and (7)(b)(II)(T) amended and (7)(b)(II)(V) added, p. 1019, § 1, effective April 17. L. 2004: (7)(c)(I) amended, p. 1738, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2006: (7)(b)(II)(N) amended, p. 2005, § 60, effective July 1; (7)(b)(II)(W) and (13) added, p. 1317, §§ 2, 1, effective July 1. L. 2011: (12) amended, (SB 11-007), ch. 107, p. 335, § 1, effective August 10; (12) amended, (HB 11-1278), ch. 224, p. 964, § 8, effective August 10. L. 2012: (11) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 862, § 101, effective July 1. L. 2013: (7)(b)(II)(B) and (7)(b)(II)(C) repealed, (HB 13-1160), ch. 373, p. 2200, § 9, effective June 5. L. 2017: (14) added, (HB 17-1109), ch. 97, p. 292, § 1, effective April 4; IP(7)(b)(II) and (7)(b)(II)(L) amended, (HB 17-1245), ch. 240, p. 989, § 2, effective August 9; IP(7)(b)(II) and (7)(b)(II)(R) amended, (SB 17-225), ch. 262, p. 1246, § 5, effective August 9. L. 2018: (7)(b)(II)(K) amended, (HB 18-1200), ch. 379, p. 2293, § 5, effective August 8. L. 2020: IP(7)(b)(II) and (7)(b)(II)(R) amended, (HB 20-1213), ch. 160, p. 754, § 6, effective June 29. L. 2021: (7)(b)(II)(P) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3166, § 178, effective March 1, 2022; repeal provisions in (7)(b)(II)(L) and (7)(b)(II)(O) added by revision, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, pp. 3166, 3331, §§ 178, 803.

Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (7)(b)(II) by Senate Bill 03-147 and House Bill 03-1020 were harmonized.

(2) Subsection (7)(b)(II)(V) was originally numbered as (7)(b)(II)(U) in House Bill 03-1020 but has been renumbered on revision for ease of location.

(3) Subsection (7)(b)(II)(L) provided for the repeal of subsection (7)(b)(II)(L), effective March 1, 2022. (See L. 2021, pp. 3166, 3331.)

(4) Subsection (7)(b)(II)(O) provided for the repeal of subsection (7)(b)(II)(O), effective March 1, 2022. (See L. 2021, pp. 3166, 3331.)

Cross references: For similar provisions concerning the place of trial, see Crim. P. 18; for change of venue, see part 1 of article 6 of title 16; for the place of trial of an action for violation of a custody order, see § 18-3-304 (4).

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Criminal Procedure in Colorado — A Summary and Recommendations for Improvement", see 22 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 221 (1950). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law", see 34 Dicta 98 (1957). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 38 Dicta 65 (1961).

Pursuant to subsection (11), the prosecution is not required to prove venue as an element of the offense and, therefore, the prosecution's burden of proof is not unconstitutionally lowered. The sixth amendment does not require venue to be an element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant's right to proper venue can be vindicated without having to submit the issue to a jury. People v. Lewis, 2017 COA 147, 433 P.3d 70.

Venue provisions are solely for the benefit of the defendant and may be waived. People v. Taylor, 732 P.2d 1172 (Colo. 1987); People v. Rice, 579 P.2d 647 (Colo. App. 1978); People v. Joseph, 920 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995).

Entry of plea forecloses objection. Once the accused subjects himself or herself to the authority of the court by offering a guilty plea, any further objection to venue is deemed waived. Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1957); People v. Joseph, 920 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995).

The propriety of venue is a matter of law and fact, not discretion. Therefore, a court must take evidence and make specific findings when it severs counts that are not triable under the court's jurisdiction. People v. Reed, 132 P.3d 347 (Colo. 2006).

Authority of district attorney is a technical matter subject to waiver. Just as a defendant may waive objections to venue, he or she may also waive any objection to the authority of the district attorney to bring a criminal charge. People v. Joseph, 920 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995).

Larceny may be prosecuted where goods stolen or brought. Larceny is considered a continuing crime and every asportation considered a new taking; thus larceny could be prosecuted not only at the place where the goods were stolen, but also wherever the goods were subsequently brought. People v. Martinez, 37 Colo. App. 71, 543 P.2d 1290 (1975).

Out-of-state theft. The Colorado courts have jurisdiction over the offense of theft which originated in the state of New Mexico. People v. Martinez, 37 Colo. App. 71, 543 P.2d 1290 (1975).

Theft committed partly in state. Where there was evidence presented that defendant exercised control over stolen chain saws in Colorado without authorization, the offense of theft was "committed partly within this state" as contemplated by § 18-1-201(2), and, therefore, in accordance with § 18-1-201(1)(a) defendant "is subject to prosecution in this state" for that offense. People v. Martinez, 37 Colo. App. 71, 543 P.2d 1290 (1975).

Under subsection (9), drug transaction crime starting in one county and completed in an adjacent county may be tried in either county even though almost all of the transaction occurred in the adjacent county. People v. Ray, 109 P.3d 996 (Colo. App. 2004).

Crime committed on highway. Under the provisions of this section where a criminal offense is committed on a public highway between two counties the trial may be had in either county. Stone v. People, 71 Colo. 162, 204 P. 897 (1922) (decided under R.S. 08, § 1908).

Where the "cause of death" is administered in one city when a defendant causes a bomb to be placed in the airplane, out of his custody and beyond his control, with the intent and for the purpose of causing the death of a passenger on the plane, the death is undoubtedly the result of defendant's unlawful act, and this having occurred in the city the venue is there properly laid pursuant to this section, and the trial court there unquestionably has jurisdiction. Graham v. People, 134 Colo. 290, 302 P.2d 737 (1956) (decided under §§ 39-9-1 and 40-2-12, CRS 53).

Venue in a kidnapping case may be either in the county in which the offense was committed or in any county through which the person kidnapped was taken or kept while under confinement or restraint. Claxton v. People, 164 Colo. 283, 434 P.2d 407 (1967) (decided under § 40-2-47, C.R.S. 1963).

Where an accused is charged with multiple crimes arising from the same criminal episode and which were committed in several counties, charges can be filed in any county in which any of the individual charges could be filed so long as such offenses were committed within the same judicial district since this section does not broaden the authority of the district attorney to file charges based on crimes committed outside the judicial district. People v. Taylor, 732 P.2d 1172 (Colo. 1987); People v. Cortez, 737 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1987).

This section does not limit the situs of a crime to the county in which the offense is committed but also includes any county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred. People v. Taylor, 732 P.2d 1172 (Colo. 1987); People v. Bobo, 897 P.2d 909 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Joseph, 920 P.2d 850 (Colo. App. 1995); People v. Shackley, 248 P.3d 1204 (Colo. 2011); People v. Black, 2022 COA 127, 524 P.3d 341.

Although some evidence against defendant was seized in a different county, there was a reasonable inference that the seized evidence was used to commit the crimes that were alleged to have been committed in the county where the trial occurred; therefore, venue was proper. People v. Richardson, 181 P.3d 340 (Colo. App. 2007).

Filing or preparing tax returns in one county is not an act "in furtherance of the offense" of criminal impersonation. Change of venue to county where work was performed was proper. People v. Nevarez-Zambrano, 222 P.3d 329 (Colo. 2010).

Under subsection (11), the prosecution is not required to prove venue as an element of the offense. Therefore, an erroneous allegation of venue does not constitute reversible error. People v. Brown, 70 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2002).

Applied in People v. Gould, 193 Colo. 176, 563 P.2d 945 (1977); People v. Donahue, 41 Colo. App. 70, 578 P.2d 671 (1978); People v. Rice, 40 Colo. App. 357, 579 P.2d 647 (1978); People v. Beck, 42 Colo. App. 69, 593 P.2d 371 (1979); People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1983); People v. Cortez, 703 P.2d 648 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd, 737 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1987); People v. Felgar, 58 P.3d 1122 (Colo. App. 2002).

PART 3

WHEN PROSECUTION BARRED BY FORMER PROCEEDINGS

Cross references: For constitutional provisions concerning double jeopardy, see § 18 of art. II, Colo. Const.

Law reviews: For article, "Pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1985-1986", which discusses cases relating to double jeopardy, see 15 Colo. Law. 1572 (1986).