Colorado § 17-22.5-101 - One continuous sentence.

§ 17-22.5-101. One continuous sentence.

For the purposes of this article, when any inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, the department shall construe all sentences as one continuous sentence.

Source: L. 84: Entire article R&RE, p. 517, § 1, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

Cumulative sentence valid. A cumulative sentence of imprisonment for a period not exceeding in the aggregate the maximum term fixed for a single offense, imposed by a judgment rendered on a number of indictments for felony which have been consolidated for trial only, is valid. Parker v. People, 13 Colo. 155, 21 P. 1120 (1889) (decided under repealed § 27-20-111).

Under application of this section, consecutive sentences would be considered one sentence, and thus, a defendant would not be eligible for release on parole until completion of all incarceration. People v. Baker, 703 P.2d 631 (Colo. App. 1985) (decided under former § 17-20-111).

Multiple sentences may be imposed to run as one continuous sentence with a single period of mandatory parole where defendant is sentenced under § 18-1.3-401 (1)(a)(V)(E). People v. Starcher, 107 P.3d 1127 (Colo. App. 2004).

Department of corrections (department) correctly construed separate consecutive sentences as one continuous sentence for purposes of determining parole eligibility. McKnight v. Riveland, 728 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1986).

In establishing a parole eligibility date, when an inmate has been convicted of several offenses with separate sentences, the department "shall construe all sentences as one continuous sentence." People v. Santisteven, 868 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1993).

In computing an inmate's parole eligibility date, this section requires the department to construe all sentences as one continuous sentence when the inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, even when doing so results in the inmate becoming parole eligible before serving at least 50 percent of the second sentence. Nowak v. Suthers, 2014 CO 14, 320 P.3d 340.

In calculating a parole eligibility date for a defendant with consecutive and concurrent sentences when the concurrent sentences have different effective dates, the department must construe all of the sentences as one continuous sentence. The department erred in applying the governing sentence approach. It is not a method for calculating sentence length. Fetzer v. Exec. Dir., 2016 COA 7M, 399 P.3d 742, aff'd, 2017 CO 77, 396 P.3d 1108.

When the department calculates an inmate's parole eligibility date based on multiple convictions and one conviction would be subject to § 17-22.5-403 (1) and the others would be subject to § 17-22.5-403 (2.5), the department must employ a hybrid method of calculation to give effect to each applicable parole eligibility date calculation for purposes of the inmate's one continuous sentence. Owens v. Williams, 2022 CO 33, 511 P.3d 637.

The new parole eligibility date for an inmate who was reincarcerated for a parole violation and is sentenced for additional offenses committed while on parole should be calculated using the beginning of the period of mandatory parole as the start of the inmate's one continuous sentence. Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70, 444 P.3d 313.

Department erred in substituting defendant's longest sentence for the required continuous sentence. Governing sentence theories serve to determine the statutory parole and discharge provisions applicable to a single continuous sentence rather than as an alternative to the statutory continuous sentence requirement itself. Exec. Dir. v. Fetzer, 2017 CO 77, 396 P.3d 1108; Owens v. Williams, 2022 CO 33, 511 P.3d 637.

Department's policy of applying a single system of credits to a composite "governing sentence" created for each inmate by considering all of the inmate's sentences together to arrive at a minimum governing sentence and a maximum governing sentence is reasonable and contravenes no legislative or constitutional rights or policies. Price v. Mills, 728 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1986); Owens v. Williams, 2022 CO 33, 511 P.3d 637.

The courts have no jurisdiction to fix parole eligibility, which is the responsibility of the department, and any attempt to do so is an illegal attempt to circumvent legislative dictates. People v. Anaya, 894 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1994).

The continuous sentence rule does not apply to prior sentences that were discharged before defendant was later sentenced in a different matter case nunc pro tunc to a date when the prior sentences were in effect. As a matter of law, when the defendant was discharged from the prior sentences, the prior sentences were no longer operable in any sense and the nunc pro tunc order could not revive them. Lewis v. Stancil, 2026 COA 8, __ P.3d __.

Applied in People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59 (Colo. 1988).