Colorado § 14-2-201 - Property ownership.

§ 14-2-201. Property ownership.

The property, real and personal, that a person in this state owns at the time of his or her marriage, and the rents, issues, profits, and proceeds thereof, and any real, personal, or mixed property that comes to him or her by descent, devise, or bequest, or the gift of any person except his or her husband or wife, including presents or gifts from his or her husband or wife, such as jewelry, silver, tableware, watches, money, and apparel, remains his or her sole and separate property, notwithstanding his or her marriage, and is not subject to the disposal of his or her husband or wife or liable for his or her debts.

Source: R.S. p. 454, § 1. G.L. § 1747. G.S. § 2266. R.S. 08: § 4181. C.L. § 5576. CSA: C. 108, § 1. CRS 53: § 90-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 90-2-1. L. 2018: Entire part amended, (SB 18-090), ch. 72, p. 637, § 2, effective August 8.

ANNOTATION

I. General Consideration.

II. Rights of Married Women at Common Law.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Law reviews. For article, "Joint Tenancy in Colorado", see 26 Dicta 313 (1949). For article, "Ownership of Personal Property Accumulated During a Marriage", see 17 Colo. Law. 623 (1988).

This act is an enabling statute and must be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of its enactment. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877).

Under such construction, controversies respecting the status of married women have practically disappeared from our jurisprudence. Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614 (1894).

The wife is placed upon precisely the same footing with a femme sole. Scott v. Mills, 7 Colo. App. 155, 42 P. 1021 (1895).

II. RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN AT COMMON LAW.

Under the common law, the wife was absolutely under the control of her husband, and without his consent she could neither act or contract with reference to any right of property. Daniels v. Benedict, 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899).

During marriage the legal existence of the woman was suspended, or incorporated and consolidated with that of her husband. Daniels v. Benedict, 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899).

Whatever property belonged to her while single, or came to her while covert, passed absolutely to her husband, or fell under his domain. Daniels v. Benedict, 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899).

Moreover, she could possess nothing to her separate use, she could alienate nothing during her life, she could bequeath nothing at her death, she could make no contract, and she could bring no suit. Daniels v. Benedict. 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899).

The wife's identity was completely merged in that of her husband. Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 P. 360 (1908).

With but few limitations, he had the control of her person, her property, her children, her labor. Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 P. 360 (1908).

Under the common law of England, from which estates by entireties sprang, husband and wife in legal contemplation constituted but one person, and they were merged by marriage into one legal entity or personality, and plurality of persons was not recognized. Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917).

She could neither sue nor be sued. Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917).

The common-law fiction that husband and wife are one does not exist in Colorado. Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935).

Separateness of spouses is clearly established by Colorado's Equal Rights Amendment, § 29 of art. II, Colo. Const., and by this article. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 546 F. Supp. 543 (D. Colo. 1982).

At common law, in the absence of evidence to show the separate ownership of the wife, the law presumed that the property was owned by the husband. Allen v. Eldridge, 1 Colo. 287 (1871).

III. STATUTORY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

A. In General.

B. Under This Section.

A. In General.

By sundry legislative acts, dating from an early period, the disabilities of coverture have been gradually removed. Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614 (1894).

The wife in Colorado was emancipated from the condition of thraldom in which she was placed at common law. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877).

The wife in Colorado is the wife under this act, and not the wife at common law, and by this act must her rights be determined, the common law affecting her rights having been swept away. Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 P. 360 (1908).

This act removed every disability which coverture had formerly imposed upon married women, so far as their separate property and earnings are concerned. Tuttle v. Shutts, 43 Colo. 534, 96 P. 260 (1908); Hedlund v. Hedlund, 87 Colo. 607, 290 P. 285 (1930).

This act places the married woman upon precisely the same footing with a femme sole, as to all matters relating to her separate property and earnings, and she may make contracts, perform labor and services on her own account, sue and be sued with reference to her separate property, business, and earnings, as if she were sole. Tuttle v. Shutts, 43 Colo. 534, 96 P. 260 (1908); Hedlund v. Hedlund, 87 Colo. 607, 290 P. 285 (1930).

Furthermore, an attempt to apply both the common law and the statutory law must end in failure. Stramann v. Scheeren, 7 Colo. App. 1, 42 P. 191 (1883).

Also, under this section when considered with the other sections of this part of article 2 of title 14, it has been uniformly held that contracts and conveyances between husband and wife are presumptively valid and effectual, without proof aliunde of their equity or justice. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877); Coon v. Rigden, 4 Colo. 275 (1878); O'Connell v. Taney, 16 Colo. 353, 27 P. 888 (1891); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 21 Colo. 181, 40 P. 358 (1895); Daniels v. Benedict, 97 F. 367 (8th Cir. 1899).

Courts can only carefully scrutinize transactions between husband and wife to see that they are not collusive, and in fraud of the rights of others, and then apply to them the same rules and legal principles that control in dealing with others. Stramann v. Scheeren, 7 Colo. App. 1, 42 P. 191 (1895).

Husbands and wives are equal under the law in respect to the conjugal affection and society which each owes to the other. Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614 (1894).

Gifts made by the husband, while sick, to the wife, were set aside at the suit of the executors of the husband's estate after his death, because of the undue influence exercised by the latter over the former in procuring the same. Meldrum v. Meldrum, 15 Colo. 478, 24 P. 1083 (1890).

It was held that a deed procured by the fraud of the wife to be made to a third party for her benefit would be set aside in equity Meldrum v. Meldrum, 15 Colo. 478, 24 P. 1083 (1890).

B. Under This Section.

Under this section the wife holds an absolute legal estate as free from the common-law rights of her husband as if she were unmarried. Palmer v. Hanna, 6 Colo. 55 (1881).

For the wife's separate estate when she has no husband, see Palmer v. Hanna, 6 Colo. 55 (1881).

Since this section confers upon the wife capacity to take and dispose of real property free from any restraint, the reason of the common-law rule has ceased to exist. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877); Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 163 P. 76 (1917).

This section provides that any gift of money from the husband shall be the sole and separate property of the wife, and not subject to the disposal of the husband or his creditors. Woodruff v. Clarke, 128 Colo. 387, 262 P.2d 737 (1953).

Where the husband owned city lots and the wife had money which she desired to invest, and under mutual agreement the lots were improved with her money, it was held that she had an equitable interest in the property which could be asserted against her husband. Stramann v. Scheeren, 7 Colo. App. 1, 42 P. 191 (1895).

Where the husband acquires and pays for real property, and causes his wife's name to be inserted in the deed as one of the grantees therein, there is a presumption that he intended it as a gift or advancement, and the burden of showing otherwise is upon him who asserts it. Woodruff v. Clarke, 128 Colo. 387, 262 P.2d 737 (1953).

There can be no doubt of the power of a husband to dispose absolutely of his property during his life, independently of the concurrence, and exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided the transaction is not merely colorable, and is unattended with circumstances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 427 P.2d 698 (1967).

If the disposition of the husband be bona fide, and no right is reserved to him, though made to defeat the right of the wife, it will be good against her. Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 427 P.2d 698 (1967).