Colorado § 6-2-111 - Unlawful acts - remedy - license - rules.

§ 6-2-111. Unlawful acts - remedy - license - rules.

(1) Any person, firm, private corporation, municipal corporation, public corporation, or trade association may maintain an action to enjoin a continuance of any act in violation of sections 6-2-103 to 6-2-108 or section 6-2-110 and, if injured thereby, for the recovery of damages. If, in such action, the court finds that the defendant is violating or has violated any of the provisions of sections 6-2-103 to 6-2-108 or section 6-2-110, it shall enjoin the defendant from a continuance of the violations. It shall not be necessary that actual damages to the plaintiff be alleged or proved. In addition to such injunctive relief, the plaintiff in said action shall be entitled to recover from the defendant three times the amount of the actual damages, if any, sustained.

(2) Without prejudice to the rights of any person, firm, private corporation, municipal corporation, public corporation, or trade association to bring an action, the attorney general has like powers to those provided in subsection (1) of this section, and it is the attorney general's duty, upon a showing by any person, firm, private corporation, municipal corporation, public corporation, or trade association that there is reason to believe that a person subject to the terms of this article 2 is violating any term of sections 6-2-103 to 6-2-108 or section 6-2-110, to prosecute the violation and seek an injunction or restraining order to enjoin the continuance of the violation.

(3) If a person, firm, private corporation, municipal corporation, public corporation, or trade association, in writing and under oath, submits to the attorney general a statement setting forth facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of a violation of sections 6-2-103 to 6-2-108 or any other provision of this article 2, the attorney general shall seek injunctive relief or a restraining order to enjoin the continuance of the violation. To this end, and for this purpose, the attorney general may appear in the attorney general's official capacity to seek relief in any court in the state having jurisdiction.

(4) A district attorney, when requested in writing by the attorney general to advise and consult with the attorney general concerning the institution and prosecution of an action described in this article 2, shall act for the attorney general in prosecution of the action. However, the attorney general may choose, select, appoint, and recompense from money provided for the purposes of enforcement of this article 2 any attorney admitted to practice in the state as a special prosecutor who has full and complete power to act for the attorney general.

(5) The attorney general, for the purposes of carrying out the terms and provisions of this article, has the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the enforcement of this article, not inconsistent with its terms, and to publish the same.

(6) The attorney general may appoint such personnel as may reasonably be required to carry out the functions prescribed for the attorney general's office.

Source: L. 37: p. 1285, § 10. CSA: C. 48, § 302(9). L. 41: p. 823, § 9. L. 49: p. 345, § 9. CRS 53: § 55-2-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 55-2-9. L. 69: p. 369, § 1. L. 2016: (2), (3), (4), and (6) amended, (HB 16-1094), ch. 94, p. 264, § 4, effective August 10. L. 2026: (2), (3), (4), and (6) amended, (HB 26-1426), ch. 334, p. 2006, § 38, effective August 12.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer", see 44 Den. L.J. 558 (1967).

Unfair Practices Act does not require that a plaintiff make a prima facie showing to support the allegations of a complaint before obtaining discovery. Direct Sales Tire Co. v. Dist. Court, 686 P.2d 1316 (Colo. 1984).

Enforcement of unfair practices act is left to the courts instead of to an administrative board. Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).

The use of the construction "sections 6-2-103 to 6-2-108" in subsection (1) includes both sections whose numbers are given and all intervening sections. Therefore the legislature did intend to create a private right of action for violations of § 6-2-108. W. Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Suncor Energy U.S.A., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Colo. 2013).

Where an injunction is sought, this section is viewed from the standpoint not of the prudent man, but rather from the standpoint of the judge hearing the case; therefore, the proper test is whether the standards contained in the statutory provisions are so vague as to make it impossible to adjudicate rights arising out of their provisions. Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d 1005 (1960).

In an injunction action, prospective in effect, the terms "cost" and "cost of doing business" are not so indefinite and uncertain as to provide no basis for the adjudication of rights. Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d 1005 (1960).

Furthermore, the adjudication itself provides notice to defendant. When a plaintiff seeks an injunction he is not demanding that the defendant be punished, but rather that he be restrained from acting unlawfully in the future. Consequently, the adjudication itself provides notice to the defendant and is prospective in its application, and the result is that the defendant is not prejudiced by the failure of the statute to provide precise and adequate warning beforehand. Where, however, the requested sanction is penal or criminal, there is a reasonable basis for requiring it to give actual prior notice so that men of common intelligence are not required to guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 141 Colo. 554, 349 P.2d 1005 (1960).

This section does not contravene § 16 of art. II, Colo. Const., which guarantees trial by jury in criminal cases, since the effect of injunctive relief in a civil action is different from that following a judgment under a criminal information. Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).

A nonprofit corporation is a proper party plaintiff for the maintenance of a suit under this section, whether it be classed as a private corporation or an association. Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).

A nonprofit corporation is entitled to the same protection against unfair competition as a for-profit corporation and has standing to bring an action for a preliminary injunction against alleged unfair competition. Am. Ski Ass'n v. Bergstedt, 682 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1984).

When there is sufficient evidence to sustain a ruling or judgment under this section, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. Dikeou v. Food Distribs. Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1941).

For an injunction held not too broad, see Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P.2d 1007 (1941).

An injunction properly entered against two companies. Where two companies had the same officers and directors, the sales manager acted as such for both companies, the products were identical and it was these products that were made the instruments of an offense under this act, an injunction restraining violations was properly entered as against both companies. Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P.2d 1007 (1941).

If the practice sought to be restrained in an injunction suit has been abandoned in good faith and for all time, a decree enjoining the practice is without prejudice to defendant, while it affords protection to which the plaintiff is entitled. Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P.2d 1007 (1941).

Consumers may maintain an action for damages if they can show that they have been injured as a result of an antitrust violation specified in this section, and the injury is the type of injury that the particular antitrust statutory provision was designed to prevent. Dunlap v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286 (Colo. 1992).