Colorado § 2-4-204 - Severability of statutory provisions.

§ 2-4-204. Severability of statutory provisions.

If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid, unless it appears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court determines that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-204.

ANNOTATION

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

In determining the severability of the sections of a statute, the court must look to legislative intent. Colo. Project - Common Cause v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 402, 495 P.2d 218 (1972).

And this general severability clause is applicable to any legislative act not containing a specific severability provision. People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 826 (1972).

A specific severability clause prevails over the general one contained in this section. Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. App. 1996).

Therefore, where a portion of a statute is unconstitutional, the remaining portions will be held valid if they are complete in themselves, not dependent on the void portion, and, therefore, can be given legal effect. Covell v. Douglas, 179 Colo. 443, 501 P.2d 1047 (1972); Shroyer v. Sokol, 191 Colo. 32, 550 P.2d 309 (1976); Williams v. City & County of Denver, 198 Colo. 573, 607 P.2d 981 (1979); Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 676 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1984); People v. Powell, 716 P.2d 1096 (Colo. 1986).

A severability clause creates a presumption that the general assembly would have been satisfied with the portions of the statute that remain after the offending provisions are stricken as unconstitutional. Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. App. 1996).

The presumption is dispelled if what remains is so incompetent or riddled with omissions that it cannot be salvaged as a meaningful legislative enactment. Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. App. 1996).

Single words or phrases, as well as self-contained sentences, subsections or sections, may be severed. Schroyer v. Sokol, 191 Colo. 32, 550 P.2d 309 (1976); Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981).

But severance is impossible if the court determines that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1981).

Severability clause could not preserve remainder of statutory scheme where debt financing provisions were inextricably intertwined with invalid provisions for reorganization and continued operation of public hospital as "private" entity. Colo. Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Bd. of Regents, 804 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1990) (decided prior to the 1991 repeal of § 23-21-401 et seq.).

And where the skeleton of a statute which remained after striking out the invalid provisions, failed to describe any offense, the trial court properly declared the entire statute unconstitutional. People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 826 (1972).

Also it would be presumptuous to say that the effective date of the act is so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the remaining provisions that the general assembly would not have enacted the valid provisions but for the invalid provisions. In re Interrogatories by the Governor, 163 Colo. 113, 429 P.2d 304 (1967).

Applied in People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Am. Banco Corp., 194 Colo. 32, 570 P.2d 825 (1977); Jeffrey v. Colo. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 198 Colo. 265, 599 P.2d 874 (1979); People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981); People v. Beruman, 638 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1982); People v. Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1982); People v. Moyer, 670 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1983); People v. Heitzman, 852 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1993); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Apostolou, 866 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1994); Colo. Dept. of Rev. v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806 (Colo. 1996); People v. Gutierrez-Ruiz, 2014 COA 109, 383 P.3d 44.