Colorado § 2-4-202 - Statutes presumed prospective.

§ 2-4-202. Statutes presumed prospective.

A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-202.

ANNOTATION

As a general rule, statutes operate prospectively, while judicial decisions are applied retroactively. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).

An amendment to a statute is not retroactively applied if the amendment covers the same subject matter as the original statute and if the person or persons claiming under the amendment had a continuing status under both the original statute and the amendment. Taylor v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 189 Colo. 486, 542 P.2d 383 (1975); Hurricane v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 703 P.2d 588 (Colo. App. 1984).

An amendment to a statute is not to be given retroactive application unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested therein. Kirby of Se. Denver, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 732 P.2d 1232 (Colo. App. 1986).

Legislation is presumed to have prospective effect unless a contrary intent is expressed by the general assembly. People v. Munoz, 857 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1993); Mission Viejo Co. v. Bd. of Equaliz., 942 P.2d 1251 (Colo. App. 1996); Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007); Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2015 COA 80, 418 P.3d 530, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236; In re Gomez, 646 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2022).

Contrary legislative intent must be clearly manifest. All statutes must be applied prospectively only, unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly manifest. Allchurch v. Project Unicorn, Ltd., 33 Colo. App. 173, 516 P.2d 441 (1973); McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990); Ficarra v. Dept. of Reg. Agencies, 849 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1993); Powell v. City of Colo. Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), aff'd, 156 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2007).

Indication of legislative intent in § 16-5-401.1 is sufficient to overcome the presumption. People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1985).

The legislature's mere invocation of the word "clarify" in a bill summary does not necessarily overcome the presumption that a substantive change in the law operates only prospectively. Novak v. Craven, 195 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2008).

If an amendment results in substantive changes to the law, the legislation will apply prospectively unless the intent for retroactivity is clear. The legislature's intent to clarify charter schools' standing to sue, and its response to the district court decision in the case, provide convincing evidence of the legislature's intent to apply changes retroactively. Acad. of Charter Schs. v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 32 P.3d 456 (Colo. 2001).

Section merely codifies common law. Stewart v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 43 Colo. App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979).

Section 11 of art. II, Colo. Const., prohibits law that is retrospective in application. Stewart v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 43 Colo. App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979).

A law is applied retrospectively only when it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation. Stewart v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 43 Colo. App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979).

Procedural or remedial change not retroactive and unlawful. Application of a statute to a subsisting claim for relief does not violate the prohibition of retroactive legislation where the statute effects a change that is only procedural or remedial in nature. Cont'l Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1982); Davis v. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 791 P.2d 1198 (Colo. App. 1989).

Changes in the burden of proof are procedural only and should be retroactively applied. Krumback v. Dow Chem. Co., 676 P.2d 1215 (Colo. App. 1983).

Amendatory language concerning remedies not presumed prospective in nature. People v. Holleron, 797 P.2d 806 (Colo. App. 1990).

Application of new 1990 water rights diligence determination statute, which the water court found to create a less onerous diligence standard than that existing under prior law and regarding which the general assembly did not express any intention should apply to diligence determinations initiated prior to the 1990 statute's effective date, was an impermissible application of retrospective law. Upper Gunnison River v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 841 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).

Unless a contrary intent is expressed in the statute, procedural changes are applicable to existing causes of action and not merely to those which accrue in the future. Loredo v. Denver Pub. Sch. Dist. 1, 827 P.2d 633 (Colo. App. 1992).

Retired judge entitled to increased benefits. Judge who had retired prior to effective date of 1977 amendment to § 24-51-607 (2)(a) (increasing pension benefit for judges with more than 5 and less than 10 years of service) was entitled to increased benefits from the effective date of the amendment. Stewart v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n, 43 Colo. App. 25, 612 P.2d 1141 (1979).

Amendment to statutory section providing that household exclusion clauses in automobile insurance policies are compatible with state public policy applies prospectively. People v. Dillings, 884 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1994).

The application of the amended Colorado exemption limits set forth in § 13-54-102 to a loan and security agreement that was entered into prior to the enactment of the amended exemption statute does not constitute a "retrospective" application of state law in violation of art. II, § 11, of the Colorado Constitution and this section. In re Larsen, 260 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001).

Applied in Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. District Court, 199 Colo. 284, 611 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1980); Thirteenth St. Corp. v. A-1 Plumbing & Heating Co., 640 P.2d 1130 (Colo. 1982); United Bank of Denver Nat'l Ass'n v. Wright, 660 P.2d 510 (Colo. App. 1983).