California § 19209 - For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings: (1

§ 19209. For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings: (1

(a) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings: (1) “Commercial off-the-shelf” means mass-produced, readily available hardware devices, including card readers, printers, or personal computers, and their firmware or software products, including operating systems, programming language compilers, or database management systems. (2) “Incorrect in part” means a full manual tally of the votes cast on the pilot system would reveal rates of error in the pilot system tally that, if extrapolated to the entire contest, would alter the electoral outcome. (3) “Partial risk-limiting audit” means a procedure that guarantees a large minimum chance of a full manual tally of the votes cast on the pilot system if the electoral outcome is incorrect in part. (4) “Risk-limiting audit” means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for the audited contest. (b) The governing board, without formally adopting a voting system, may provide for the experimental use of the voting system in a pilot program held in one or more precincts at a single election or, in the case of a special election, the special primary election and the special general election, if the voting system complies with either of the following: (1) The voting system is certified or conditionally approved prior to its experimental use. (2) The voting system meets all of the following requirements: (A) Uses only software and firmware with disclosed source code, except for unmodified commercial off-the-shelf software and firmware. (B) Meets the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 19101. (C) Meets the requirements of the regulations adopted by the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (g). (D) Implements risk-limiting audits. (c) A voting system that meets all of the requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) need not be certified or conditionally approved prior to its experimental use in a pilot program if the number of voting system units deployed in the pilot program is limited to the number necessary to test and demonstrate the capabilities of the voting system in a limited number of precincts or locations, including a prudent number of reserve units to ensure that sufficient working units will be available to conduct the pilot program. In no event shall the number of voting system units exceed 50 percent of the estimated number of units that would be required for full deployment of the voting system at every polling place and early voting site in a statewide election throughout the jurisdiction. Capabilities that may be taken into account in determining the number of voting system units reasonably necessary to test and demonstrate the capabilities of the voting system include, but are not limited to, all of the following: (1) The capability of the voting system to accommodate voting in all languages in which the jurisdiction is required to provide ballots under applicable state and federal laws. (2) The capability of the voting system to accommodate voting by persons with a broad range of physical and cognitive disabilities, as required by applicable state and federal laws. (3) The current and projected number of voting-eligible individuals in the jurisdiction. (4) The geography and distribution of the population in the jurisdiction. (d) No later than nine months before the election at which the pilot program of a voting system is proposed to be conducted, the governing board shall submit to the Secretary of State a plan for the pilot program. The Secretary of State shall approve or reject the plan no later than three months after receipt of the plan. (e) The votes cast on a voting system during a pilot program pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be subject to risk-limiting audits. (1) For each contest conducted entirely on the pilot voting system, the jurisdiction conducting the pilot program shall conduct a risk-limiting audit with at least a 90-percent chance of requiring a full manual tally of the contest whenever a full manual tally would show an outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the pilot voting system. (2) For each contest conducted partially on the pilot voting system, the jurisdiction conducting the pilot program shall conduct a partial risk-limiting audit of the portion of the contest in which the voters cast their votes on the pilot voting system, with at least a 90-percent chance of requiring a full manual tally of all votes cast using the pilot voting system whenever the outcome is incorrect in part. (3) (A) If a risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of all of the ballots cast in the contest, then the contest outcome according to that manual tally shall become the official result. (B) If a partial risk-limiting audit of a contest leads to a full manual tally of the ballots cast using the pilot voting system, the vote counts according to that manual tally shall replace the vote counts reported by the pilot voting system for the purpose of determining the official contest results. (4) Risk-limiting audit procedures shall comply with all other requirements in regulations adopted by the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (g). (f) Upon completion of the pilot program, the governing board shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of any defect, fault, or failure of the hardware, software, or firmware of the voting system or a part of the voting system. (g) A voting system pilot program shall not be conducted in a legally binding election without the prior approval of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish regulations governing voting system pilot programs.